The Fire
Activities of Federal Law Enforcement Agencies Toward the Branch Davidians
Report House of Representatives
104th Congress, 2nd Session, Union Calendar No. 395
August 2, 1996
VIII. The Fire
At 12:07 p.m., Central Standard Time, more than 6 hours after the
FBI began to implement the plan to end the standoff, fire was detected
inside the Branch Davidian residence. Within a period of 2 minutes, two
additional fires were detected in two other parts of the structure. In
less than 8 minutes the fire had spread throughout the structure. By the
end of the afternoon, the structure was completely destroyed.
The subcommittees received testimony from the leader of a team of
fire experts called together by the Texas Rangers to investigate the
origins of the fire,\601\ a fire expert retained by the Justice
Department to join with the team assembled by the Texas Rangers,\602\
and an independent arson investigator.
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\601\ U.S. Dept. of Justice, Report to the Deputy Attorney General
on the Events at Waco, Texas 329 (1993) [hereinafter Justice Department
Report].
\602\ These individuals visited the scene of the fire on April 22-
24, 1993. Hearings Part 3 at 119 (statement of James Quintiere).
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During the testimony of these witnesses, the subcommittees also
reviewed videotape recordings of the development and spread of the fire.
Included in this review was a videotape using ``forward looking
infrared'' (FLIR) technology, which was taken from an FBI observation
plane circling the Branch Davidian residence throughout the morning and
afternoon of April 19. The FLIR type of video, also called a Thermal
Imaging System, is a type of video photography which images thermal heat
sources. Because of its sensitivity to changes in the quantity of heat
given off by an object the FLIR videotape showed the beginning of the
fires within the Branch Davidian residence prior to the point at which
was the flames were visible to persons on the outside of the structure.
Time lapse indicators on the video tape recordings were used by the
witnesses to establish the times at which each fire within the Branch
Davidian residence began.
a. summary of the development of the fire
During the hearings, James Quintiere, professor of Fire Protection
Engineering at the University of Maryland and one of two fire experts
retained by the Justice Department to join the fire review team
assembled by the Texas Rangers, used the FLIR video tape to demonstrate
the development of the fire on April 19. Dr. Quintiere's
responsibilities as a part of the Review Team were to analyze the
development of the fire and draw interpretations and conclusions from
that analysis.\603\ In addition to reviewing the FLIR video, the fire
investigation team reviewed television coverage of the fire by the
Canadian Broadcasting Corp., which was also time dated, and television
coverage of the fire by a local Waco television station. The team also
reviewed aerial photographs and other materials. During his testimony to
the subcommittees, Dr. Quintiere played a video tape that simultaneously
played each of the three video tapes of the fire synchronized to the
same time.
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\603\ Id.
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The videotape demonstration showed that the first fire began at
12:07:42 p.m. As part of his testimony to the subcommittees, Dr.
Quintiere narrated the videotape demonstration. As the first fire
developed, Dr. Quintiere testified,
If you look at this point here, you will see this window begin
to turn slightly grayish, it does right now. Nine seconds later
the window on the opposite side right here is going to also show
an illumination which is due to this temperature rise, and in my
opinion that is due to smoke being transported from the fire
started at one end of the room to the other end of the room. . .
. The room was a second floor room approximately 16 x 11 in
dimensions and about 8 feet high, which is presumed to have been
a bedroom. One minute later the second fire begins on the first
floor at the rear of the dining room.\604\
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\604\ Hearings Part 3 at 135.
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Dr. Quintiere then described the development of the second fire.
We are looking at the development of the fire in that bedroom
area, the second floor right tower. What we are going to see
here at 12:09:42, we will see an event known to people who
investigate and study fire. That event is called flashover, and
that is a point when we have a transition in this fire in which
the fire goes from a discrete object that you could discern very
readily burning in a room such as this to a point where flames
now fill the room, and that transition can occur in seconds. It
is known as flashover. Before that time the room might be
survivable.
After that time it is definitely not, and now the fire is a
threat to spreading to other rooms.\605\
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\605\ Id. at 136.
Finally, Dr. Quintiere described the inception of the third fire, which
occurred on the first floor in the chapel area.\606\ He also noted that
38 seconds later there emerged hot gases at a point 45 feet away from
the point where the third fire began. He testified that this could have
been a separately set, fourth fire, but that the development of this
fire was consistent with someone placing a trail of gasoline or other
liquid fuel between those two points and allowing the third fire to
spread over that trail.\607\
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\606\ Id.
\607\ Id. at 136-137.
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As Dr. Quintiere summarized his conclusions:
If we can just pause at this point, you can see the fire here,
the first fire. A minute later, a fire began in the dining room
area, and a minute after that a fire began in this chapel. It
has not burned through the roof yet, but the ignition in the
debris area because of the wind has now propagated significantly
over that debris area. These are three distinct fires.
From this information I can conclude that these three fires
that occurred nearly 1 minute apart were intentionally set from
within the compound. Also, you have the time periods involved
and the very discrete different locations. None of these three
fires could have caused any of the others because their growth
rates would not provide sufficient heating to cause such remote
ignitions.\608\
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\608\ Id. at 138.
The experts testified that they believed the fires were
intentionally set by Branch Davidian members in order to destroy the
structure.\609\ Supporting this conclusion is that fact that the fire
review team found that a number of accelerants were present in the
structure and on the clothing of some of the surviving Davidians,
including gasoline, kerosene, Coleman fuel, and other accelerants.\610\
As Dr. Quintiere testified,
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\609\ Id. at 138, 191 (``I don't discount that the fires were
started inside by the people inside.'') (statement of Rick Sherrow).
\610\ Id. at 166, 187-188 (statement of Paul Grey).
Although normal furnishings and interior construction
characteristics would provide a means for fire propagation, the
more than usual rapid spread of these fires, especially in the
dining room and the chapel areas, indicates to me that some form
of accelerant was used to encourage to the rapid spread of these
fires.\611\
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\611\ Id. at 138.
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b. other theories concerning the development of the fire
1. Whether the methylene chloride in the CS riot control agent used by
the FBI caused the fire
One of the theories forwarded to the subcommittees concerning the
origin of the fire is that methylene chloride, a chemical used as a
dispersant to carry the CS riot control agent injected into the Branch
Davidian residence, may have ignited and started the fire. During the
hearings Dr. Quintiere testified that it was his opinion that the
methylene chloride in the CS agent neither caused nor contributed to the
spread of the fire.
According to Dr. Quintiere, methylene chloride, when a vapor in air,
is flammable at ambient air levels of 12 percent or greater.\612\ This
conclusion is supported by information provided by the manufacturers of
methylene chloride.\613\ The subcommittees review of the evidence
presented indicates that the levels of methylene chloride present in the
residence on April 19 was far below this concentration.\614\
Additionally, a spark, flame, or other source of heat is necessary for
methylene chloride to ignite and a fireball-like event would have
resulted. As Dr. Quintiere testified,
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\612\ Id. at 140.
\613\ Letter from Peter Voytek, executive director, Halogenated
Solvents Industry Alliance, Inc. to Glenn R. Schmitt, counsel to the
Subcommittee on Crime (July 25, 1995). See also generally Mallinckrodt,
Inc., Material Data Safety Sheet 1 (1989); Dow Chemical, Inc., Material
Data Safety Sheet 1 (1988).
\614\ See section VII F of this report.
In other words, anything above 12 percent to approximately 20
percent, it would be in the flammable range, and if we had a
spark or a small match and if we had conditions like that, we
would have a fire propagating through the atmosphere much like a
fireball. There was no observation like that made for this
fire.\615\
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\615\ Hearings Part 3 at 140.
The only fireball which did occur took place well after the fires had
engulfed the building, and was most likely due to the explosion of a
canister of propane gas.\616\ Accordingly, because there was no
explosion prior to the beginning of the fire, there is no evidence that
methylene chloride vapor present in the air caused the outbreak of the
fire.
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\616\ ``[T]he explosion happened well after the building was totally
destroyed. It was very unlikely that that explosion was anything other
than a propane cylinder. . . . There was, in fact, a hundred pound
propane cylinder with a piece of the top blown out about the size of a
football exactly where that explosion occurred, and I have no doubt that
that is what the big explosion is. . . .'' Id. at 175-176 (statement of
Paul Gray).
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Dr. Quintiere also noted that methylene chloride is generally in a
liquid state and that as the methylene chloride vapor condensed and fell
in droplets to the floor of the structure after the CS was inserted the
methylene chloride generally would have evaporated. In some instances,
however, the chemical could have collected in a puddle. He testified
that such a puddle would have been difficult to ignite due to the
presence of chlorine in the chemical. He testified that ``in some sense
[methylene chloride] acts like an inhibitor.'' \617\ He further
testified that he conducted experiments using methylene chloride as a
``wetting'' agent by depositing it on wood, paper, and other flammable
objects that might have been found in the structure in an effort to
determine whether the methylene chloride might have burned along with
these items. As a result of these experiments, he concluded ``that the
methylene chloride had no enhancement effect on the fires spread over
the room furnishings and other things that burned in the compound.''
\618\
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\617\ Id. at 140.
\618\ Id.
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2. Whether the irritant chemical in the CS riot control agent used by
the FBI caused or contributed to the spread of the fire
At the hearings Dr. Quintiere testified that he had reviewed the
literature concerning the ignition point of the chemical irritant in CS
agent and noted that the temperature at which that chemical would ignite
was comparable ``to what we would find from most fuels around us.''
\619\ Based upon his review of the literature, Dr. Quintiere testified
that it was his opinion that the CS powder that is an active irritant in
the riot control agent did not enhance the spread of the fire.\620\
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\619\ Id.
\620\ Id.
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3. Whether the combat engineering vehicles used by the FBI on April 19
started the fire
Some theories concerning the origin of the fire involve an
explanation that one of the combat engineering vehicles used by the FBI
to inject CS chemical agent and to demolish portions of the Branch
Davidian residence may have actually caused the fire, either
intentionally or unintentionally.
At one point in the video record of the operation on April 19, a
combat engineering vehicle is seen driving into a portion of the
residence. The first fire begins in that same location shortly
thereafter. Some have suggested that the CEV might have overturned a
lighted kerosene lantern inside the residence, causing the fire to
begin. The fire that begins in that area, however, is not discernable in
the FLIR video until 1\621\ During the hearings, Dr. Quintiere was
questioned on the significance of this fact.
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\621\ Id. at 135 (statement of James Quintiere).
Mr. Schiff: Well, if there were lanterns in use and if you
had, either through vibrations of tanks hitting walls or through
a number of people, panicking inside at what they might have
perceived was an assault, notwithstanding the FBI broadcast
going to them, couldn't either or both of those factors easily
overturned lanterns inside the compound?
Dr. Quintiere: Well, the only evidence of a tank being in the
vicinity of one of the fires is the first fire, and that tank
has not left 1\1/2\ minutes after the fire has begun. If that
tank knocked over a lantern and the lantern were lit, we would
have seen it in that FLIR video because it would have been
sensitive enough to see that. If the tank had spilled a lantern
and there was no flame there to ignite it, that's possible, but
somebody would have to come in and put a flame in that.\622\
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\622\ Id. at 143.
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Some citizens have contacted the subcommittees to suggest that the
combat engineering vehicles used by the FBI at Waco carried flame
throwing devices which were used to intentionally set the fires inside
the Branch Davidian residence. During the hearings, the fire experts
were questioned about this theory.
Mr. Schumer: Another theory we have heard mentioned is that a
flame thrower from the tanks started the fire. Now as I
understand it, we would have to have seen on the FLIR a hot
streak going from the tank to the building for that to happen.
Dr. Quintiere: Absolutely.
Mr. Schumer: And we did not; is that correct?
Dr. Quintiere: Absolutely.
Mr. Schumer: So you are saying a flame thrower from the tanks
starting the fire--is that consistent--is that theory consistent
with what we saw on the tape?
Dr. Quintiere: No, indeed. There was no such thing as a flame
thrower on those vehicles.\623\
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\623\ Id. at 144. See also Id. at 172 (``The flame-throwing tank
absolutely did not happen.'') (statement of Rick Sherrow).
On another day of the hearings, a Defense Department witness testified
that all of the military vehicles loaned by the Defense Department to
the Department of Justice and used at Waco were unarmed.\624\
Additionally, the subcommittees' interviews with other persons present
at the Branch Davidian residence on April 19 confirms that none of these
vehicles was armed.
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\624\ Id. at 314 (statement of Allen Holmes, Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict).
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c. whether the davidians could have left their residence after the fire
began
Throughout the morning of April 19, none of the Davidians left their
residence. After the fire broke out, however, nine persons left the
building.\625\ This indicates that at least some opportunity existed for
the Davidians to safely leave the structure had they wanted to do so.
One of those who escaped the fire left the residence almost 21 minutes
after the outbreak of the first fire.\626\ Clearly, some means of escape
from the residence existed for a significant period of time after the
fire broke out.
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\625\ Justice Department Report at 298. Two of these persons, Clive
Doyle and David Thibodeau testified before the subcommittees at the
hearings.
\626\ Hearings Part 3 at 139 (statement of James Quintiere).
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An important question, however, is whether the Davidians might have
been overcome by smoke and prevented from leaving the residence. The
autopsies of the Davidians indicate that deaths from smoke inhalation or
asphyxiation from carbon monoxide poisoning accounted for only half of
the Davidians who died in the residence. The other causes of death were
gunshot wounds, burns, or other trauma. Thus, even after the fires began
to consume the structure, at least half of the Davidians were not so
affected by the smoke and fumes from the fire that they were physically
unable to leave the structure.
Additionally, the location of the bodies of the Davidians indicates
that few of the Davidians actually attempted to escape the building.
Many of the bodies were huddled together in locations in the center of
the building.\627\ Few of the bodies were located at points of exit from
the building, and autopsies indicates that the cause of death of several
of the bodies at exit points were self-inflicted gunshot wounds or
gunshots from very close range.
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\627\ A chart indicating the location of the bodies found after the
fire in the remains of residence is contained in the Appendix.
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At the hearings before the subcommittees, Dr. Quintiere testified as
to his opinion as to whether the Davidians could have left the
structure. He testified,
I've estimated . . . that the occupants would have had
sufficient warning in no doubt [sic] that the fire occurred, and
this would have enabled them to escape for up to five minutes
from the start of that first fire or perhaps as many as 20
minutes in some protected areas of the building.
So between and interval of five minutes after the fire started
and maybe as much as 20 minutes, a person could have escaped
from some parts of the building.\628\
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\628\ Hearings Part 3 at 139.
Paul Gray, Assistant Chief of the Houston Fire Department and leader of
the fire review team assembled by the Texas Rangers, agreed with this
opinion, ``I would take an educated guess of about 20 to 22 minutes from
the inception of the fire, from the first ignition that there may have
been some viable conditions inside the building.'' \629\ As the report
of the team led by Gray summarized,
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\629\ Id. at 183.
[A] great many of the occupants could have escaped to the
outside of the compound even as the building burned. . . .
[C]onsidering the observable means of exit available, we must
assume that many of the occupants were either denied escape from
within or refused to leave until escape was not an option.\630\
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\630\ Justice Department Report at 335.
In light of this evidence, the subcommittees conclude that there was
a period of time after the fires began within which the Davidians could
have escaped the residence. The evidence presented to the subcommittees
indicates that the Davidians did not attempt to leave the building
during the fire. In light of the Davidians' religious beliefs that fire
would play a part in the end of their worldly lives, the subcommittees
conclude that most of the Davidians either did not attempt to leave
their residence during the fire or were prevented from escaping by other
Davidians. Had they made such an attempt and not been hindered in the
attempt, however, conditions were such that for sufficient period of
time after the fires broke out many of the Davidians could have
survived.
d. the fbi's planning for the fire
According to the Justice Department Report, at a meeting in early
April, one of the government attorneys raised the possibility of fire at
the compound and suggested to the FBI that ``fire fighting equipment be
placed on standby on the scene.'' \631\ Additionally, the Medical Annex
to the operations plan for April 19, which listed the locations of
``primary'' and ``secondary'' hospitals in the area noted that local
hospitals should not be used to treat major burns but that one of the
secondary hospitals was ``primary for major burns.''
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\631\ Id. at 302.
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According to the Justice Department Report, the FBI decided to not
have fire fighting equipment at the scene ``for fear that they would be
fired upon by Koresh and his followers.'' \632\ Yet shortly after the
reports of fire, the FBI command post requested fire fighting assistance
be requested. The first fire fighting vehicles arrived in the vicinity
20 minutes later and, at 12:41 p.m., approached the structure. In total,
the fire crews did not reach the structure until 31 minutes after the
fire had first been reported.\633\ The report also asserts that Jeffrey
Jamar, the FBI's on-scene commander at Waco, stated to Justice
Department officials during the their internal investigation of the
incident that ``even if the fire fighters had arrived at the compound
earlier he would not have permitted them to enter due to the great risk
to their lives.'' \634\
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\632\ Id.
\633\ Id.
\634\ Id.
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The subcommittees do not dispute the Justice Department's position
that at the outbreak of the fire it would have been dangerous for fire
fighters to approach the structure. Yet, the subcommittees find it
troubling that even though the government clearly believed there existed
a strong possibility of fire, no provision was made for fire fighting
units to be on hand, even as a precaution. If, as the Justice
Department's Report implies, the government had decided in advance that
it would not attempt to fight any fire that occurred (and thus did not
make provision for fire fighting units to be present at the compound),
it is difficult to understand why the FBI placed a call for fire
fighting units to be summoned to the scene immediately upon the
commencement of the fire.
e. findings concerning the fire
1. The evidence indicates that some of the Davidians intentionally
set the fires inside the Davidian residence. While the evidence is not
dispositive, the evidence presented to the subcommittees suggests that
some of the Davidians set the fires that destroyed their residence. The
evidence demonstrated that three distinct fires began in three separate
parts of the Branch Davidian residence within a 2 minute period on April
19. Additionally, the fire review team found that a number of
accelerants were present in the structure, including gasoline, kerosene,
and Coleman fuel, and that in at least one instance these accelerants
contributed to the spread of the fire in a manner that indicates an
intention to spread the fire.
2. The methylene chloride in the CS riot control agent used by the
FBI did not cause the fire. There is no evidence that methylene chloride
vapor in the air in the residence, present as the result of its use as a
disbursant for the CS riot control agent, caused the outbreak of the
fire. The evidence presented to the subcommittees indicated that for the
methylene chloride to have burned some spark must have ignited the
methylene chloride vapor and that a fireball would have resulted.
Because no fireball was observed until well after the fire had become
established, the subcommittees conclude that methylene chloride did not
cause the fire.
3. The subcommittees conclude that Federal law enforcement agents
did not intentionally set the fire. The evidence before the
subcommittees clearly demonstrates that no fire began at or near the
time when any of the combat engineering vehicles used by the FBI came
into contact with the structure. Had a flamethrower or similar device
been installed on one of the CEV's and used to start the fire its use
would have been observable in the infrared videotape of the fire. No
such use is recorded on the that videotape. Accordingly, the
subcommittees conclude that the FBI did not use any of the CEV's
intentionally to cause the fire.
4. The subcommittees conclude that Federal law enforcement agents
did not unintentionally cause the fire. The evidence presented to the
subcommittees suggests that it is highly unlikely that Federal law
enforcement officials unintentionally caused the fires to occur. The
evidence demonstrates that the fires broke out at points in time when no
vehicle used by the FBI was in contact with the structure or had been in
contact with the structure immediately prior to those points. Because
this would have been the case had these vehicles inadvertently caused
the fires to break out by disturbing flammable materials inside the
Davidian residence, the subcommittees conclude that it is highly
unlikely that the vehicles inadvertently caused the fires to occur.
5. The FBI should have made better preparations to fight the fire.
While it may have been too dangerous to fight the fire when it initially
erupted, it remains unknown as to whether it might have been safe for
fire fighters to approach the building at some point earlier than the
half hour later when they were allowed access. While fire fighting
efforts might not have extinguished the fire, they could have delayed
the spread of the fire or provided additional safe means of escape for
some of the Davidians. It also does not appear as though the FBI
considered obtaining armored fire-fighting vehicles from the military.
In any event, given the government's strong belief that a fire might
take place, and its action in summoning fire fighting units to the
scene, the subcommittees conclude that the FBI should have made better
provision for the presence of fire fighting equipment as part of its
overall plan to end the standoff.
6. The Davidians could have escaped the residence even after the
fire began. After the fire broke out on April 19, nine persons left the
Davidian residence. This indicates that at least some opportunity
existed for the Davidians to safely leave the structure had they wanted
to do so. As one person left the structure 21 minutes after the outbreak
of the first fire, some means of escape from the residence existed for a
significant period of time after the fire broke out. The autopsies of
the Davidians indicate that many of the Davidians were not so affected
by the smoke and fumes from the fire that they were physically unable to
leave the structure. Additionally, the location of the bodies of the
Davidians indicates that few of the Davidians actually attempted to
escape the building. In light of this evidence, the subcommittees
conclude that there was a period of time after the fires began within
which the Davidians could have escaped the residence.
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