Negotiations to End the Standoff with the Davidians

Activities of Federal Law Enforcement Agencies Toward the Branch Davidians

Report House of Representatives
104th Congress, 2nd Session, Union Calendar No. 395
August 2, 1996

         VI. Negotiations To End the Standoff With the Davidians

    Negotiations between the FBI and the Branch Davidians continued for 
51 days during which time the negotiators utilized generally accepted 
negotiation techniques. The FBI was unwilling to engage in a novel 
approach toward the Davidians.
    While American hostage negotiation training, especially FBI 
training, is thought to be the best in the world, there remains 
considerable room for reassessment and, based on the Waco record, 
improvement. The FBI possesses exceptional negotiators, but the Bureau 
was unwilling to engage outside experts and too eager to ignore the 
advice given by its own experts. The evolving nature of hostage 
barricade situations necessitates that in the future the FBI continually 
strive for the preparedness to confront more emotional and unpredictable 
barricaded subjects. At Waco, FBI resistance to different negotiation 
methods may have contributed to a premature decision to end the 

       a. the conflict between tactical commanders and negotiators

1. The problem with two teams: one negotiating team and a tactical team
    At Waco, the FBI Crisis Management Team was deployed. The Crisis 
Management Team is made up of a variety of law enforcement 
professionals, among them agents trained as tactical agents and as 
negotiators. The team was divided into groups with separate leadership 
and different responsibilities. Each team gave its perspective to 
Jeffrey Jamar, the Special Agent in Charge, who determined which 
strategy to employ in negotiations. There often was a conflict between 
these two approaches.
    Although disposed to the active approach, Jamar allowed the 
proposals of each team to be implemented simultaneously, working against 
each other.
            a. Standard Procedure in Negotiations
    According to the FBI's Chief Negotiator, Gary Noesner, the conflict 
between tactical and negotiating teams is the one universal element in 
law enforcement operations of this type.\368\ FBI tactical forces are 
trained to act in stressful, violent situations. Agents are inclined 
toward the ``action imperative,'' the sense among agents that motivates 
them to act.\369\ Negotiators are more inclined to seek a nonviolent 
resolution of the standoff simply by virtue of their training.
    \368\ Briefing by Federal Bureau of Investigation Supervisory 
Special Agent Gary Noesner to the subcommittees, November 1995.
    \369\ Id.
    The FBI has a policy in place that favors a negotiated 
settlement.\370\ Through a type of negotiation called active listening, 
negotiators attempt to find ways to explain to the barricaded subject 
why it is in his best interest to seek a nonviolent solution. This FBI 
policy and training of negotiators conflicts with the ``action 
    \370\ Id.
            b. Major disagreements between the two teams
    Each team adamantly argued to Jamar on behalf of its perspective and 
adamantly opposed the other's.\371\ Dr. Alan A. Stone \372\ chronicled 
the progression in strategy that occurred among the FBI Commanders at 
Waco in his Report and Recommendations. At first, according to Stone, 
``the agents on the ground proceeded with a strategy of conciliatory 
negotiation, which had the approval and understanding of the entire 
chain of command. Pushed by the tactical leader, the commander on the 
ground began to allow tactical pressures to be placed on the residence 
in addition to negotiation.'' \373\ Stone summarized the feelings of 
negotiators of this inevitable progression. Stone writes, ``This 
changing strategy at the residence from (1) conciliatory negotiating to 
(2) negotiation and tactical pressure and then to (3) tactical pressure 
alone, evolved over the objections of the FBI's own experts and without 
clear understanding up the chain of command.'' \374\
    \371\ U.S. Dept. of Justice, Report to the Deputy Attorney General 
on the Events at Waco, TX 75 (1993) [hereinafter Justice Department 
Report]. ``The guiding principle in negotiation and tactical employment 
is to minimize the risk to all persons involved--hostages, bystanders, 
subjects, and law enforcement officers.'' But the Justice Department 
report states that the negotiating components of the FBI strategies were 
``more often contradictory than complimentary.''
    \372\ Alan A. Stone, M.D., Touroff/Glueck Professor of Psychiatry 
and Law at Harvard University, originally was asked to participate in 
the Department of Justice Waco review team. For a variety of reasons, 
including time constraints, Dr. Stone submitted an individual report 
apart from the Justice Department Report. See infra note 373.
    \373\ Alan A. Stone, Report: To Deputy Attorney General Philip 
Heymann, Report and Recommendations Concerning the Handling of Incidents 
Such as the Branch Davidian Standoff in Waco, TX, Panelist, Alan A. 
Stone, M.D., (November 8, 1993) [hereinafter Stone Report].
    \374\ Id.
    The disagreement was called a ``fundamental strategy disagreement.'' 
\375\ The negotiators suggested that tactical maneuvers worked against 
the negotiation process. The tactical team wanted to employ aggressive 
tactics. Regarding the conflict with tactical people, McClure says 
simply, ``Tactical people think in tactical terms and negotiators think 
in negotiation terms.'' \376\ Byron Sage, a Supervisory Special Agent 
and the lead day-to-day FBI negotiator at Waco, testified before the 
subcommittees, ``[The conflict between tactical and negotiation teams] 
presented difficulties, for sure, but that is not unusual. These are not 
matters that we were not prepared to attempt to negotiate through.'' 
\377\ In the end, however, the tactical team won the endorsement of 
    \375\ Hearings Part 2 at 316. Gary Noesner testified before the 
subcommittees, ``At Waco, there was a fundamental strategy disagreement 
on what was the best way to proceed. In Waco, the negotiation team 
wanted to have a lower-keyed approach and the tactical team's approach 
was more to apply pressure.'' Id.
    \376\ Id. at 147.
    \377\ Id. at 321.
    Jamar decided to constrict the perimeter of the building by moving 
vehicles closer to the residence. On March 9, 1993 the FBI began to use 
Bradley Fighting Vehicles to clear debris (including automobiles and 
boats) from the front of Mount Carmel. On March 14, 1993 the FBI focused 
bright lights on the residence in an effort to disrupt the sleep of 
those inside. Four days later, loudspeakers were set up to communicate 
messages from the FBI to the Davidians inside the residence. Soon 
thereafter, the FBI began playing recordings of Tibetan chants, rabbits 
being slaughtered, and other sound effects.\378\
    \378\ Justice Department Report at 78.
    While negotiators were trying to gain the trust of Koresh and the 
Davidians, the actions of the tactical team gave Davidians reason to 
distrust FBI's negotiators. At the hearings, Sage explained, ``It is not 
uncommon to, as part of the negotiation process, to actually try to 
ingratiate yourself a little bit more with Koresh and his followers by 
saying, look, this is out of our hands, but that is why you need to give 
us something to work with.'' \379\ It is difficult to imagine that use 
of tactical force could be a beneficial tool with those whom experts say 
should be treated with caution and conciliation. Notwithstanding Sage's 
description of the tactical maneuvers as helpful to negotiations, any 
consequences of aggressive movements on the part of FBI were not ones it 
intended. They were predicted, however. Gary Noesner remarked, ``I do 
not awake from nightmares or have trouble sleeping at night . . . 
because everything that I predicted would happen, did happen.'' \380\
    \379\ Id.
    \380\ Briefing by Gary Noesner to the subcommittees.
            c. Insufficient communication between the two teams and 
                    their commanders
    In testimony before the subcommittees, Jamar described the strategic 
decisionmaking process. He said, ``The supervisors of each component 
would get together and report and discuss matters. And we would have 
various meetings.'' \381\ Noesner said the problem was not one of 
communication. Jamar's office was across from the negotiation room. 
Noesner communicated the desired approach of negotiators with regularity 
and often in heated exchanges. Jamar heard opinions from the negotiators 
and tactical agents given with equal force. He let each strategy go 
forward as if it was the primary one.\382\
    \381\ Hearings Part 2 at 300.
    \382\ Briefing by Gary Noesner to the subcommittees.
            d. Decisions between the options presented by the two teams
    In early 1993, FBI policy was to place the Special Agent in Charge 
of the FBI's regional office in charge of making operational decisions 
in a crisis like Waco. Noesner described the role of the SAC saying, 
``He has to take the information and couple that with the information he 
receives from other intelligence sources, from the tactical team and he 
has to weigh all those things, weigh them with his own experiences and 
his own perceptions and he has to come to a decision.'' \383\
    \383\ Hearings Part 2 at 311.
    Noesner emphasized the fact that the real problem in Waco was one of 
leadership. The situation at Waco required someone to make the decision 
on what strategy to utilize to confront this ``unconventional'' group. 
He characterized Jamar as an action-oriented agent, one who fell prey to 
the ``action imperative.'' \384\
    \384\ Briefing by Gary Noesner to the subcommittees.
    Stone describes the action imperative in terms of the FBI's ``group 
psychology.'' The options available to the FBI, according to Stone, fell 
somewhere between ``doing nothing (passivity) and a military assault 
(the action imperative).'' \385\ In light of the fact that ``the appeal 
of any tactical initiative to an entrenched, stressed FBI must have been 
overwhelming,'' Stone reasons, ``the desultory strategy of simultaneous 
negotiation and tactical pressure was enacted as a compromise.'' \386\ 
Stone concluded that tactical maneuvers were initiated as a way to 
relieve agents' desire to act. It is left to the SAC to override the 
group psychology of the agents on the ground and make the decisions 
necessary to reach a peaceful conclusion. Stone writes, ``The FBI should 
not be pushed by their group psychology into misguided ad hoc decision 
making the next time around.'' \387\
    \385\ Stone Report at 23.
    \386\ Id.
    \387\ Id. at 24.
            e. The effect on negotiations of the decision to employ 
                    tactical maneuvers
    The decision to employ tactical maneuvers had the exact result 
negotiators and experts predicted. The experts advised against 
antagonizing the Davidians.\388\ In a memorandum coauthored by Peter 
Smerick, an FBI Criminal Investigative Analyst, and Park Dietz, Clinical 
Professor of Psychiatry and Biobehavioral Sciences at the UCLA School of 
Medicine, the FBI was advised that ``negotiations coupled with ever 
increasing tactical presence . . . could eventually be counter-
productive and could result in loss of life.'' \389\ When tactical 
maneuvers were utilized, negotiations were set back. The Davidians were 
unable to sleep with sounds of loud music and rabbits being slaughtered. 
The Davidians were angered by movements of the armored personnel 
carriers. They were angered by the clearing of debris from the 
grounds.\390\ As Richard DeGuerin, the lawyer representing Koresh, says, 
tactical maneuvers appeared to be ``calculated to discourage anyone from 
coming out.'' \391\
    \388\ Memorandum from Criminal Investigative Analyst Peter Smerick 
and Dr. Park Dietz, Clinical Professor of Psychiatry and Biobehavioral 
Sciences at the UCLA School of Medicine (March 5, 1993).
    \389\ Id.
    \390\ Hearings Part 2 at 74-75.
    \391\ Id.
    The effect that the tactical maneuvers had on negotiations was only 
one of the problems resulting from that decision. In fact, some believe 
that playing loud music bonded the Davidians closer together.\392\
    \392\ Id. at 195. Captain McClure thought the playing of chants and 
rabbit slaughters was unwise.
            f. Tactical maneuvers may have fed into the vision 
                    anticipated by Koresh
    Koresh often warned Davidians that they would die in a fire brought 
on by ``the Beast.'' \393\ In Smerick's March 8 memo, he recommended 
that tactical pressure ``should be the absolute last option we should 
consider, and that the FBI might unintentionally make Koresh's vision of 
a fiery end come true.'' \394\ When the FBI began to play loud music and 
inch closer to the residence in armored vehicles, experts maintained 
that those were exactly the wrong tactics.\395\ More than simply bonding 
the Davidians together, experts concluded that these actions proved 
Koresh right in the minds of the Davidians. The Justice Department 
Report notes, ``Some of the experts felt that the aggressive tactical 
moves played into Koresh's hands.'' \396\ Even Jamar, who made the 
decision to use these tactics, said, ``I did not like it.'' \397\
    \393\ Thomas Robbins & Dick Anthony, Sects and Violence: Factors 
Enhancing the Volatility of Marginal Religious Movements, in Armegeddon 
in Waco: Critical Perspectives on the Branch Davidian Conflict 236, 240 
(Stuart Wright ed., 1996). ``Koresh clearly anticipated a government 
assault, and the actual military-style raid that the BATF perpetrated 
against the Waco Davidian settlement in late February 1993 `seemed to 
those inside to validate at least part of Koresh's prophecy.' '' Id.
    \394\ Memorandum from Criminal Investigative Analyst Peter Smerick 
(March 8, 1994).
    \395\ Justice Department Report at 185.
    \396\ Justice Department Report at 185.
    \397\ Hearings Part 2 at 317.

                    b. negotiation opportunities lost

1. Why the FBI changed negotiators
    Soon after the raid, the FBI was called to take command of the 
situation at the Davidian residence. Edward Dennis writes that ``ATF 
requested assistance from the FBI on February 28, 1993 after ATF agents 
had attempted to serve an arrest and search warrant on the Branch 
Davidian Compound.'' \398\ Before the FBI took over, negotiations with 
the Davidians had begun. Lieutenant Larry Lynch, of the McClennan County 
Sheriff's Department, and Branch Davidian Wayne Martin talked over the 
Waco 911 Emergency line.\399\ Soon thereafter, ATF Assistant Special 
Agent in Charge James Cavanaugh and Davidians Steve Schneider and Koresh 
spoke by telephone in an attempt to resolve the initial firefight.\400\ 
Finally, Cavanaugh successfully negotiated an end to the shooting.
    \398\ Edward S.G. Dennis, Jr., Evaluation of the Handling of the 
Branch Davidian Standoff in Waco, TX 5 (1993) [hereinafter Dennis 
    \399\ McLennan County Sheriff's Department, 911 Transcripts 
(February 28, 1993).
    \400\ Id.
    Cavanaugh, with the help of the Texas Department of Public Safety, 
made measurable progress toward release of Davidians. Communication was 
extremely difficult between Davidians inside and ATF agents outside. 
Nonetheless, Cavanaugh manipulated the dialog from the hysterical 
screaming during the gun battle to productive conversation leading to a 
cease fire.
            a. Cavanaugh's rapport with the Davidians
    The most difficult task after the raid failed was to establish a 
reliable, common sense method for communicating with those inside Mount 
Carmel. Communicating the agreed upon cease fire was made difficult by 
the size of Mount Carmel and the fragmentation of ATF agents.\401\ 
Eventually, however, the shooting stopped and negotiations began.
    \401\ Justice Department Report at 105. [E]ven after Schneider and 
Cavanaugh had agreed to call a cease-fire, it took several minutes to 
achieve one. Schneider for his part had to walk throughout the residence 
to tell people inside to stop shooting. Cavanaugh, who had no direct 
radio link to each agent, had to advise the team leaders of the cease 
fire and the team leaders in turn had to communicate with their agents. 
The cease-fire was negotiated for a period of time before the shooting 
finally stopped. Id.
    In his statement to the Department of Justice, Agent Cavanaugh gave 
a compelling description of the first moments after the raid.\402\ The 
atmosphere was frenetic and hostile. Cavanaugh's tone was friendly as he 
sought to gain the trust of those in the residence.
    \402\ Department of the Treasury Document, statement of James 
    ``I called the compound directly on the phone from the undercover 
house. I reached a man named Steve, later identified as Steve Schneider. 
I told him I was an ATF agent and I wanted to talk to him about this 
situation. As should be expected, the activity inside the compound was 
very frantic, people were screaming and yelling, and there was still 
shooting going on both sides. Steve was very excited and very hostile.
    ``I wanted to negotiate a cease fire, and he [Schneider] was 
agreeable. I am not going to be good on the time of how long it took, 
but it took a little while to negotiate that. He had to go throughout 
the compound, which is very large, telling everyone not to shoot. While 
he was doing this, there was still shooting going on both sides. I had 
to get on the command net frequency and tell the commanders on the 
ground there not to shoot, and they had to relay that to all 100 agents, 
who were around there, so it took a little time to arrange it.
    ``Once I returned to the rear command post I called back in on the 
telephone to the residence about 2:00 p.m. and I spoke with Steve and 
David Koresh about what was going on. We had long conversations about 
the warrant and we also had a lot of conversations about Biblical 
passages and Mr. Koresh's belief that he was the Lamb of God, who would 
open the Seven Seals. As you might assume, he was very hostile, very 
angry, and very upset.''
    Cavanaugh gained the Davidians' trust by acknowledging the 
Davidians' point of view.\403\ He granted many of their requests.\404\ 
He talked with them as though they were ``equals'' trying to achieve the 
same goals. Cavanaugh assuaged their concerns by promising that they 
would be addressed. Most importantly, Cavanaugh established a routine 
that produced the release of some Davidians.\405\
    \403\ Hearings Part 2 at 187. ATF agent James Cavanaugh, the initial 
negotiator during the standoff, testified before the subcommittees, 
``[The FBI] established trust with Koresh. Id. Cavanaugh appears to have 
been accomplished at active listening. The FBI, however, did not choose 
to retain Cavanaugh.
    \404\ A summary of the Davidians' requests can be found in the 
Justice Department Report in the Appendix.
    \405\ Hearings Part 2 at 74. Representative Peter Blute, when 
questioning a witnesses, stated, ``We also know that, after the raid, 
when the siege started, the initial negotiator was getting through to 
Koresh and they had a kind of relationship intellectually that allowed 
numerous people to be released during that period. . . .'' Id.
    Cavanaugh established a rapport with Koresh and other Davidians. 
When Cavanaugh left the negotiations, Koresh mentioned that he missed 
Cavanaugh. He noted that Cavanaugh promised to be there until the 
end.\406\ But on March 4, 1995 Cavanaugh left Waco, only to return 
briefly in April. After Cavanaugh's departure, the negotiations were an 
FBI operation.
    \406\ Transcripts of the Negotiations Between the FBI and the 
Davidians (March 4, 1993) [hereinafter Negotiation Transcripts].
            b. Why the FBI was brought in
    The ATF asked for the aid of the FBI and agreed that it would be 
best for the FBI to assume operational control of the entire siege.\407\ 
All of the official reports note that the FBI was asked to take over the 
    \407\ Justice Department Report at 22.
    \408\ Treasury Department Report at 114. Justice Department Report 
at 1.
    According to the Justice Department Report, the FBI Hostage Rescue 
Team was the law enforcement organization best equipped to handle the 
standoff.\409\ It is because of its expertise that the FBI is called in 
to take control of complex barricade situations throughout the country 
and the world. According to the Treasury Department Report on the 
incident, ATF knew immediately after the raid began that it would need 
the help of the FBI. The apparent unanimity is expressed in the 
Department of Treasury Department Report.\410\ Once the decision was 
made to turn the operation over to the FBI, the FBI was in charge of the 
scene in Waco within a matter of hours.
    \409\ Justice Department Report at 144. At the time, the FBI's HRT 
consisted of a 50 person force. It was trained to deal with highly 
dangerous missions. The team boasts ``sophisticated armament including 
infra-red aiming devices, daytime and nighttime sniper capabilities, 
explosive and mechanical breaching abilities, and certain non-lethal 
weapons.'' The agents are trained for tactical operations on land and at 
sea. The HRT was created in the 1980's to confront a growing number of 
unusually dangerous and complicated criminal situations.
    \410\ U.S. Dept. of the Treasury, Report of the Department of the 
Treasury on the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms Investigation 
of Vernon Wayne Howell also known as David Koresh at 113-114 (1993) 
[hereinafter Treasury Department Report].
    Shortly after the shoot-out, Chojnacki spoke with Hartnett, who was 
in Washington, DC and recommended that the FBI Hostage Rescue Team be 
brought to Waco to handle what had become a siege situation. At roughly 
the same time, FBI Director William Sessions learned of the shoot-out, 
contacted ATF Director Stephen Higgins and offered his condolences and 
his agency's assistance. After Hartnett arrived at the National Command 
Center and was fully briefed, he determined that the FBI HRT should be 
sent to Waco.
    Soon after the cease-fire Hartnett contacted Douglas Gow, FBI 
Associate Deputy of Investigations, and formally requested FBI 
assistance. Gow, in turn, contacted FBI SAC Jeffrey Jamar (San Antonio) 
and briefed him on the situation. FBI Special Agent James Fossum (Waco) 
was informed of the crisis by both AUSA Phinizy and another local FBI 
agent. Shortly after [Fossum] arrived, Chojnacki told him the ATF would 
welcome whatever assistance the FBI could provide.
    * * *
    Clark informed [Noble] that a request for the HRT had already been 
made by ATF and that the HRT was on its way to the residence to evaluate 
the situation.
    Jeffrey Jamar (San Antonio), as the SAC of the affected district, 
was given command of the FBI operation. He arrived in Waco at about 5:30 
p.m. and together with Fossum and several other local FBI agents, 
immediately began to establish a command post and assess the situation. 
The balance of the HRT members began arriving on March 1. After further 
discussions with FBI, ATF and Treasury officials, Noble spoke with ATF 
Director Higgins and ADLE Hartnett early March 1. Noble advised them 
that if the FBI determined that the HRT was needed for a long term, the 
FBI should have operational command to resolve the standoff. Id.
2. Why the FBI didn't allow others to participate in the negotiations
    The FBI was disinclined to allow anyone, other than the FBI's own 
negotiators, to participate in negotiations with the Davidians. Many 
were offering their assistance, but few were allowed to participate. 
McLennan County Sheriff Jack Harwell and the Texas Rangers were 
suggested and offered their help. Attorneys for Davidians repeatedly 
asked to speak with the Davidians. It was with great hesitance that the 
FBI allowed Sheriff Harwell to speak with the Davidians, and with even 
greater reluctance that the FBI allowed the attorneys into the 
    \411\ Justice Department Report at 133.
            a. Sheriff Jack Harwell
    Early in the negotiations, Koresh and the Davidians told the 
negotiators they had a cordial relationship with Sheriff Jack Harwell. 
On March 13, Jamar allowed Sheriff Harwell to participate in 
negotiations. According to the Justice Department Report, to allow an 
untrained negotiator to participate in such operations was a ``departure 
from conventional negotiation doctrine.'' \412\ In preparation for these 
negotiations, Noesner and the FBI negotiations put Harwell through quick 
and intense training in professional negotiations. Harwell was put in 
this position only because he was a person whom both sides trusted. And 
although the negotiators were worried about Harwell making the situation 
worse, negotiators' worries were soon quelled when they discovered, 
according to Noesner, ``Harwell was a natural.'' \413\
    \412\ Id.
    \413\ Briefing of Gary Noesner to the subcommittees.
    Two days after he began participating in negotiations, Harwell 
participated in a face-to-face meeting with Sage and Davidians Martin 
and Schneider. The meeting produced no substantial change in the 
situation. Harwell and Sage attest to the fact that a ``rapport was 
established, particularly with Schneider.'' \414\ Unfortunately, 
whatever success may have been brought about by Harwell's participation 
was hindered by what Sage called a ``distinct change in negotiation 
strategy.'' \415\ From that point on, Harwell's participation in the 
negotiations consisted of having his previous conversations broadcast 
into the residence via loudspeaker.
    \414\ Justice Department Report at 133.
    \415\ Id. at 134.
            b. The Texas Rangers
    Another group for which Davidians expressed their trust was the 
Texas Rangers. A longstanding and well respected law enforcement entity, 
the Texas Rangers were charged with conducting the final investigation 
into the raid on the Davidians. The Rangers were never allowed to 
participate in negotiations with the Davidians. They often had concerns 
about the conduct of the siege and attempted to express these concerns 
to Jamar. The Rangers were frustrated by a lack of communication with 
Jamar. As Captain Byrnes testified before subcommittees, ``[I]f I went 
over there, the door was already closed to where Mr. Jamar was. Several 
times I waited a half hour, 45 minutes to see him and never saw him, and 
I finally quit going over there. We couldn't even get a phone call 
through. It was total lack of communication.'' \416\
    \416\ Hearings Part 2 at 159.
            c. The attorneys for the Davidians
    Another concern of the Rangers was the FBI's decision to allow face-
to-face meetings between the Davidians and their attorneys. While it is 
common for a client under investigation or prosecution to meet with his 
attorney, it is rare for an attorney to meet with his client while his 
client is the subject of a ``hostage barricade situation.'' \417\ The 
negotiators and the tactical agents had different opinions on the wisdom 
of letting the attorneys into the residence.\418\
    \417\ Id. at 23. DeGuerin says it's a frequent practice of attorneys 
to meet with their clients before they are arrested. Id. Texas Ranger 
Captain Byrnes testified before the subcommittees, ``We went to see Mr. 
Jamar and offered a Ranger to help with the negotiations, if that would 
be helpful--not one of the captains but one of the Rangers that had been 
trained, most of them, by the FBI. He thanked us for that offer, and we 
never heard anything else about it.'' Id. at 297.
    \418\ Id. at 23.
    The negotiators were concerned that any third party intermediary was 
ill equipped to be thrust into the fragile negotiations that consume 
barricade situations. Negotiators were willing to use the attorneys in 
ways that would jumpstart the negotiations.\419\ The tactical team, 
along with the Texas Rangers, were concerned about the opportunity that 
DeGuerin and Jack Zimmerman, the attorney for Steve Schneider, would 
have to destroy evidence. But even Texas Ranger Senior Captain Maurice 
Cook agreed with the wisdom of letting the attorneys into the residence 
by saying, ``[Y]ou got to do what works.'' \420\ Jamar made the decision 
because he was ``focused on resolving the standoff peacefully.'' \421\ 
DeGuerin and Zimmerman entered the residence on several occasions. The 
attorneys spent a total of 32 hours with Koresh.\422\
    \419\ FBI Commander Jeffrey Jamar testified before the 
subcommittees, ``I was hopeful they could appeal to his self-interest. 
Everything Mr. Koresh did was to his self-interest.'' Id. at 312-313.
    \420\ Texas Ranger Captain Cook testified before the subcommittees 
that when all else fails in negotiations, ``you got to do what works. I 
think you can get too formalized.'' Although formal training opposes 
this. McClure says it can be used as a last resort. Id. at 146.
    \421\ Justice Department Report at 91. ``The proposed face-to-face 
meeting between Koresh and DeGuerin caused significant controversy 
within law enforcement. SAC Jamar made the decision to permit the 
meeting, clearing it with U.S. Attorney Ederer. The AUSA's [Assistant 
U.S. Attorney] and the Texas Rangers, who would be responsible for the 
eventual prosecutions, strongly opposed the meeting. Jamar was focused 
on resolving the standoff safely, while the prosecutors and the Texas 
Rangers were focused on the integrity of future court proceedings. The 
prosecutors and Texas Rangers were afraid that the defense attorney 
would give advice to Koresh which could result in the destruction of 
evidence and cause a more difficult prosecution.'' The attorneys met 
inside the residence approximately seven times.
    \422\ Hearings Part 2 at 79.
    Mrs. Thurman: How many total hours did you spend with [Koresh], do 
you think, in the period of time that you represented him.
    Mr. DeGuerin: About 32 hours.
    (i) Progress was made from the visits.--Negotiators and Jamar had 
the sense that the meetings were ``positive.'' \423\ On April 1, when 
the attorneys requested extensions of the pre-approved time limits, they 
described their progress as ``terrific.'' In that meeting, David Koresh 
promised to come out ``after Passover.'' \424\ The actual date of 
Passover, however, was a matter of controversy.
    \423\ Id. at 304-306.
    \424\ Id. at 47.
    On April 14, a telephone conversation between DeGuerin and Koresh 
produced what DeGuerin called a promise to come out.\425\ The FBI called 
this promise ``a new precondition for his coming out.'' \426\ The 
precondition was the completion of David Koresh's written interpretation 
of the ``Seven Seals,'' discussed in the Bible's Book of Revelation.
    \425\ Negotiation Transcripts (April 14, 1993).
    \426\ Hearings Part 2 at 304-306.
    A letter attesting to the surrender offer followed the verbal 
promise. But the FBI remained skeptical.\427\
    \427\ Jamar testified before the subcommittees, ``They would build 
their [DeGuerin and Zimmerman] spirits up. I can remember one instance 
when DeGuerin came out and, believe me, he put his best effort in and I 
give him all the credit in the world for the effort he made. He would 
build him up and then cut his legs out from under him. I remember one 
instance where he said he was making a point with him and Koresh feigned 
illness. It happened to us all the time.'' Id. at 297-298.
    (ii) Negotiator and lawyers consultation after the first visit.--
After each visit and on occasion when there was no visit, the FBI and 
the lawyers had discussions about strategy and about arranging more 
visits with Davidians. The agents worked closely with the attorneys 
before each visit and attorneys cooperated with the FBI.
    Before the trips into the Davidian residence, the agents and 
attorneys arranged time limits and topics for discussion while the 
attorneys were inside.\428\ On only one occasion did the attorneys ask 
to remain in the residence longer than the arranged time.
    \428\ Id.

             c. lack of appreciation of outside information

1. Why the FBI did not rely more on religious advisors to understand 
    Many argue that the reason negotiations failed was that the FBI 
failed to grasp the nature and strength of Branch Davidian beliefs. 
There exists a conflict among those who believe negotiators should never 
become sympathetic with the ``hostage taker'' and others who believe the 
only way to negotiate is to understand the subject of the 
negotiations.\429\ The FBI became frustrated with endless dissertations 
of Branch Davidian beliefs and ignored assertions of religious experts 
that Koresh could be negotiated with on a theological level.\430\ The 
FBI grew skeptical that Koresh could be convinced that ending the siege 
was in his best interest.
    \429\ Noesner Briefing. Noesner maintains that a negotiator should 
never become embroiled in a discussion of the beliefs of the subject of 
the negotiations; never give the barricaded person the benefit of 
believing he has control of the conversation. Dr. Phillip Arnold, of the 
Reunion Institute in Houston, TX, and Dr. James Tabor, Associate 
Professor of Religious Studies at the University of North Carolina at 
Charlotte, suggest that Koresh could have been dealt with through a 
discussion of his biblical interpretations. According to the Harvard 
Negotiation Project, ``negotiating [with people acting out of religious 
conviction] does not require compromising your principles. More often 
success is achieved by finding a solution that is arguably consistent 
with each side's principles.'' Roger Fisher et al., Getting to Yes 
    \430\ Justice Department Report at 26-28. The Department of Justice 
report recounts Koresh's attempt to tell his side of the situation.
            a. The FBI standard in negotiations
    Mainstream negotiation tactics call for the negotiator to remain 
aloof from the subject of the negotiations, to pursue crisis management 
team goals, and never become embroiled in the message of the hostage 
taker.\431\ The focus of negotiation training is ``active listening.'' 
The negotiator is supposed to find out what the subject wants or 
    \431\ Noesner Briefing.
    Negotiation training gives preference to those with a social science 
background. The FBI negotiation curriculum includes abnormal psychology 
and the social sciences. Time after time, David Koresh, and Davidians 
Wayne Martin and Steve Schneider, sought to speak with someone who could 
understand the Branch Davidian interpretation of the Seven Seals. The 
FBI resisted the desire to engage Koresh in such a discussion, saying 
that it was sure to be fruitless.\432\ McClure testified at the hearings 
that he had been involved in a similar situation when religious 
discussions of a barricaded group had proved fruitless. He said, ``In 
1987, I was involved in a situation in Atlanta where 1,400 Cubans were 
holding 121 hostages. Their religious belief was very important to them 
during that period of time. Those hostages were held for 12 days. Every 
time that we gave a negotiations and responded to their religious 
questions and got in their head or tried to get into their head and they 
tried to get into our about religion, no progress was made. When we 
talked about secular issues, we got people out.'' \433\ This experience 
appears to have led the FBI to avoid religious discussions with the 
    \432\ Hearings Part 2 at 181.
    \433\ Id.
            b. Experts consulted
    When the FBI first arrived in Waco, it had little information about 
David Koresh and the Davidians. Negotiators sought as much information 
as possible about the group. It was left to the experts hired by the FBI 
to create a profile of David Koresh and develop a plan to negotiate with 
the Davidians.
    Dr. Eugene Gallagher, professor of Religion at Connecticut College, 
calls Glenn Hillburn, Dean of the Baylor University Department of 
Religion, ``the one expert with a firm grasp of the history of the 
Davidians within the framework of the Seventh Day Adventists.'' \434\ 
According to the Justice Department Report, Glenn Hillburn, Dean of the 
Baylor University Department of Religion, ``provided information on the 
Book of Revelations, the Seven Seals, and other Biblical matters.'' 
\435\ The report makes no mention of special insight Hillburn provided 
into the peculiar habits of the Davidians or David Koresh. Other than 
Dr. Hillburn, Dr. Gallagher concludes, the FBI consulted few religious 
experts with knowledge of Branch Davidians and what they believed. 
Indeed, Stone says in his Report and Recommendations, ``One of my fellow 
panelists believes--and I am convinced--that the FBI never actually 
consulted with a religious expert familiar with the unconventional 
beliefs of the Davidians.'' \436\
    \434\ Interview of Dr. Eugene Gallagher by Robert J. Shea, Special 
Assistant to the Subcommittee on National Security, International 
Affairs, and Criminal Justice, in New London, CT (October 23, 1995).
    \435\ Justice Department Report at 189.
    \436\ Stone Report at 43, 44.
            c. The failure to consult outside experts
    The FBI relied on experts with whom it was familiar. But, there were 
individuals who embraced the peaceful resolution of the situation in 
Waco as their personal crusade. Among those who made serious efforts to 
help were Philip Arnold, Associate Professor of Religious Studies at the 
University of North Carolina at Charlotte, and Gene Tabor of the Reunion 
Institute in Houston, TX. It was difficult for Arnold and Tabor to 
intercede. The Justice Department Report mentions that ``[t]he FBI 
refused to permit a live telephone conversation'' between Arnold and 
Schneider although Schneider requested Arnold by name.\437\
    \437\ Justice Department Report at 186. ``On March 17, Schneider 
told the FBI that he and some of the other residence members had heard 
of Dr. Arnold as someone with expertise about the Book of Revelations 
and the Seven Seals, and that they wanted to speak with him. The FBI 
refused to permit a live telephone conversation, but offered an exchange 
of audiotapes instead. On March 19, the FBI sent an audiotape that Dr. 
Arnold had made into the compound.'' Id.
            d. What communications did they have with Koresh?
    Tabor and Arnold saw a video sent out by Koresh and thought 
effective negotiation was possible if the FBI dealt with Koresh within a 
framework of the Bible, particularly the Seven Seals.\438\ Koresh had 
heard Arnold giving his interpretation of the Seven Seals and offering 
assistance on the KJBS radio.\439\
    \438\ Hearings Part 2 at 46-47.
    \439\ Id.
    Neither Arnold nor Tabor ever spoke with Koresh. Koresh and 
Schneider repeatedly asked to speak with Philip Arnold. Arnold and Tabor 
were allowed to send in tapes of their interpretations at the request of 
DeGuerin, Zimmerman and Koresh, himself. But at no time were they 
allowed to participate in the negotiations.
            e. Did the FBI take any of this advice?
    It goes against standard negotiation policy to allow outsiders to 
participate in serious and dangerous ``hostage'' negotiations. 
Consistent with the advice of FBI experts, the negotiators in Waco did 
not allow outsiders to participate in negotiations out of fear that 
something they said might inflame David Koresh. Arnold and Tabor were no 
exception, they were ignored.
    From the very beginning, negotiators failed to take seriously the 
point of view of the Davidians.\440\ According to the Justice Department 
Report, ``There were certain areas of activity in which the FBI did not 
seek outside help. The FBI did not request assistance . . . with 
negotiations, since the FBI's best negotiators were assigned to Waco 
throughout the fifty-one day standoff.'' \441\ It appears that the FBI 
paid no attention to those experts who believed Koresh could have been 
reasoned with within the proper religious and biblical context.
    \440\ Id. at 362. Cavanaugh testified before the subcommittees, ``I 
fully respected their religious beliefs. I think all the other 
negotiators did, also. I do not mean to be sarcastic, but my feeling was 
they can worship a golden chicken if they want to, but they cannot have 
submachine guns and hand grenades and shoot Federal agents. I played the 
role as policeman. I did not try to fool the Davidians that I was 
something else. I think that is one reason that Koresh certainly trusted 
me from the beginning.'' Id.
    \441\ Justice Department Report at 157.
    Koresh and Davidians talked frequently in religious terms. In their 
book, Tabor and Gallagher quote the following passage from the 
negotiation tapes to point out frustration with the FBI's lack of 
familiarity with theology:

          HENRY: Let's not talk in those terms, please.
          KORESH: No. Then you don't understand my doctrine. You don't 
        want to hear the word of my God.
          HENRY: I have listened to you and listened to you, and I 
        believe in what you say, as do a lot of other people, but the, 
        but the bottom line is everybody now considers you David who is 
        going to either run away from the giant or is going to come out 
        and try to slay the giant. For God's sake, you know, give me an 
        answer, David. I need to have an answer. Are you going to come 
          KORESH: Right now, listen.
          HENRY: Right now you're coming. . .
          KORESH: ``He that dasheth in pieces is come up before thy 
        face: keep the munition.'' What's the munition? ``Watch the 
          HENRY: One of the things, one of the things is I don't 
        understand the scriptures like you, I just don't.
          KORESH: Okay, if you would just listen, then I would show you. 
        It says here--it says here, ``The Chariots shall be with flaming 
        torches.'' That's what you've got out there [referring to the 
    \442\ James Tabor and Eugene Gallagher, Why Waco? 110 (1995).

    FBI negotiators maintain that they never discounted Branch Davidian 
beliefs. However, in one conversation with Koresh, Byron Sage responds 
to another long dissertation by Koresh. Sage says, ``That's garbage.'' 
Later in that same conversation, Sage says, ``No one in the FBI has ever 
scoffed at your beliefs.'' \443\
    \443\ Negotiation transcripts, March 17, 1993.
    In their book about Waco, Tabor and Gallagher are critical of the 
negotiations. They write, ``Koresh's interpretations went completely 
over the heads of the FBI negotiators, who were understandably put off 
by this approach.'' \444\ Despite the fact that the overwhelming 
majority of David Koresh's communications involved intense and lengthy 
dissertations on biblical text, the FBI refused to allow a religious 
expert to engage David Koresh or to consult in negotiations.
    \444\ Id.
    Much of the criticism of negotiations centered on the fact that the 
FBI never engaged Koresh or the Davidians in a discussion of theology. 
Noesner said ``there are two consistent themes that you will hear from 
every mental health expert that knows anything about crisis 
intervention, crisis negotiation, and that is that you neither embrace 
someone's belief system nor do you discount it.'' \445\ Some are 
convinced that a prerequisite to successful negotiations with the 
Davidians is a firm grasp of the religious doctrine on which they base 
their beliefs.\446\ In hearings before the subcommittees, Arnold 
testified that the FBI negotiators were ill prepared for productive 
discourse with the Davidians, ``[The negotiators] were not able to 
perceive the meaning of the religious language the Davidians were using. 
They were not able to understand the actions the Davidians took. Had 
they had knowledge of the religious faith of the Davidians, this story 
could have ended in a much better and happier way.'' \447\ Others simply 
suggested that negotiators should search out experts to grasp better the 
subjects of the negotiations. As Representative Henry Hyde, chairman of 
the Committee on the Judiciary, said, ``There is an unwillingness to 
understand or believe that there are people in the world who are persons 
of belief and they believe strange things by our standards. [H]ad the 
understanding been these weren't hostages, these were willing members of 
a religious group, and to get in there and to dissipate them would take 
persuasion, argumentation from their frame of reference, not tear gas 
and tanks.'' \448\ With at least a good background on the subject of 
religion, particularly the religious dogma professed by the Davidians, 
the negotiators could have better manipulated the conversations.
    \445\ Hearings Part 2 at 325.
    \446\ Nancy T. Ammerman, Waco, Federal Law Enforcement and Scholars 
of Religion, in Armegeddon in Waco: Critical Perspectives on the Branch 
Davidian Conflict 282, 282-283 (Stuart Wright ed., 1996). Ammerman 
writes, ``Did [the FBI] not know that apocalyptic beliefs should be 
taken seriously, that they were playing the role of the enemies of 
Christ? Did they not know that any course of action that did not seem to 
come from the Bible would be unacceptable to these students of 
Scripture? I have yet to encounter a single sociologist or religious 
studies scholar who has the slightest doubt that the strategies adopted 
by the FBI were destined for tragic failure.'' Id.
    \447\ Hearings Part 2 at 144-145.
    \448\ Id. at 47-48.
2. Others who contributed information
    It is clear that all of the attention focused on Waco and the 
standoff at Mount Carmel encouraged many people to contribute their 
ideas to the negotiations. The method for processing this information is 
central to discerning whether any valuable advice or data was omitted 
or, inadvertently or intentionally, ignored. In this case, as in others, 
the actions taken by the FBI depended largely upon the information used, 
and to whom it was made available when key decisions were being made.
            a. How much information was coming in?
    It is clear that a great deal of unsolicited information was being 
sent to Waco. In addition to people honestly offering assistance, a 
variety of people came to Waco to express a variety of sentiments to 
officials on site.\449\ This was in addition to the experts retained by 
the FBI. As the Justice Department report suggests, ``The FBI also 
received unsolicited advice and offers of assistance from many 
individuals; not surprisingly, this input was rarely useful.'' The 
report continues, ``A smaller number of offers came from individuals 
lacking a firm grip on reality, such as people claiming to be God or 
Jesus offering to `order' Koresh to leave the compound.''
    \449\ Justice Department Report at 156. The report discusses the 
among and type of information coming into Waco. ``The FBI also received 
unsolicited advice and offers of assistance from many individuals; not 
surprisingly, this input was rarely useful.'' For example, on March 16, 
1993 a well-known rock band contacted the FBI and offered to perform 
outside the Mount Carmel Residence, and to play a song that U.S. 
helicopters broadcast at enemy troops to demoralize them during the 
Vietnam war. On the other hand, the FBI received an unsolicited letter 
from the Harvard Negotiation Project containing thoughtful and specific 
suggestions to assist the negotiators in formulating a framework for 
further negotiations with Koresh. A smaller number of offers came from 
individuals lacking a firm grip on reality, such as people claiming to 
be God or Jesus offering to ``order'' Koresh to leave the compound. One 
person was arrested on his way to the compound brandishing a samurai 
sword, which he said ``God had told him to deliver to Koresh.'' Id.
    Negotiator Byron Sage recounted in a Justice Department interview 
that ``an incredible number of people called the negotiators offering 
help.\450\ [I] tried to field these offers early on, but then [I] farmed 
it out to the behavioral science people to weed out the good stuff.'' 
\451\ Others indicate that information was indiscriminately delivered to 
negotiators.\452\ According to Dr. Stone, ``all kinds of experts . . . 
allegedly were consulted . . . and took it upon themselves to offer 
unsolicited advice.'' Stone continues, ``the prevailing pattern in the 
information flow during the crisis was for each separate expert to offer 
the FBI an opinion.'' The problem, it seems, was too much 
    \450\ All incidents investigated by the Department of Justice 
contain interviews of those involved in the incident. This interview was 
conducted in conjunction with the investigation of the incident at Waco.
    \451\ U.S. Dept. of Justice, record of interview of Byron Sage by 
Susan DeBusk (August 26, 1993).
    \452\ Stone Report at 43.
    \453\ Hearings Part 2 at 145. Tabor registers his sympathy for the 
FBI in the fact that they were on information overload. He also suggest 
some procedural way of compiling information and discerning the ``nuts 
from the bolts.'' Id.
            b. The method set up to communicate with people calling to 
    Many people called who were deemed ``lacking a firm grip on 
reality.'' When asked about such contacts with agents and officials in 
Waco, Chief Negotiator Gary Noesner said he knew nothing about them. 
Offers for help, however, were referred to the consulting experts. The 
experts analyzed the information provided or the assistance offered and 
passed it along to the negotiators in the form of memoranda.\454\ Rarely 
did these people talk to negotiators, themselves, and never were they 
allowed to speak to the Davidians.
    \454\ U.S. Dept. of Justice, record of interview with Byron Sage by 
Susan DeBusk (August 26, 1993). In this interview, Sage recounted how he 
got information from those offering assistance. In that interview, Sage 
says, ``Many of the contacts with experts would be through the 
behavioral science people rather than through the negotiators. The 
negotiators would get the end result of their input from people like 
Smerick, Young and Van Zandt.''
    Sage maintains that the theologian on whom he depended the most was 
Glenn Hillburn, the chairman of the Baylor School of Religion. In 
addition to his role as religious advisor to Sage, Hillburn ``provided . 
. . his feeling as to the credibility and bona fides of people who 
called in offering their help.'' \455\ In one instance, an offer of 
assistance was made by the Harvard Negotiation Project.\456\ The letter 
sent to Waco was written by Roger Fisher, director of the Harvard 
Negotiation Project, and was based on an analysis of the situation that 
was underway at the project and utilized the principles of negotiation 
that the project taught every day. The proposal made in the letter to 
Jamar included putting together ``a small team . . . as familiar as 
possible with Koresh and the situation inside the residence'' that would 
``find a potential `third party' and work urgently on putting together a 
package that would be attractive to Koresh.'' The letter suggested that 
the government allow ``the third party to come to Waco and make the 
offer, which will inherently expire if not accepted before the third 
party leaves Waco in two or three days.'' \457\ The advice that the 
Harvard Negotiation Project offered was disregarded. Although the letter 
is mentioned in the Justice Department report, there is little evidence 
that the negotiators took any of that advice.
    \455\ Id.
    \456\ The Harvard Negotiation Project is an enterprise of Harvard 
Law School that attempts to present alternatives to traditional 
negotiation techniques.
    \457\ Letter from the Harvard Negotiation Project to Jeffrey Jamar 
(March 29, 1993).
    Despite a steady flow of information and advice, the FBI did not 
make any serious attempt to evaluate and disseminate the suggestions 
that came to its attention. The Justice Department maintains that it 
kept ``meticulous'' \458\ track of the offers of assistance. It also 
concedes that it did not need or accept help in many areas.\459\ Yet it 
is difficult to understand why the offers of help from respected, 
credible religious experts and experts in negotiations were rejected.
    \458\ Justice Department Report at 156.
    \459\ Id. at 156 ``Throughout the Waco standoff, the FBI 
meticulously kept track of all unsolicited offers of assistance, and 
followed up on those that seemed to promise any reasonable chance of 
producing helpful information. There were certain areas of activity in 
which the FBI did not seek outside help. For example, the FBI did not 
request assistance from any outside law enforcement agencies in 
performing any of its tactical operations; it did not request assistance 
with negotiations, since the FBI's best negotiators were assigned to 
Waco throughout the 51-day standoff, and it did not consult with outside 
experts regarding the decision to play loud music and Tibetan Monk 
chants over the loudspeakers to irritate those inside the residence.'' 

     d. the fbi's failure to follow its own expert's recommendations

1. What the FBI's own experts recommended
    According to Stone, ``the FBI investigative support unit and trained 
negotiators possessed the psychological/behavioral science expertise 
they needed to deal with David Koresh and an unconventional group like 
the Davidians.'' \460\ Among the many experts, the talent was 
extraordinary and the amount of information they had to use was 
enormous. It was not difficult for the experts to come to a consensus.
    \460\ Stone Report at 12.
    The clearest consensus among the FBI experts and others was not to 
provoke the Davidians. The experts feared that any provocation could 
lead Koresh to initiate the fiery end he predicted. FBI experts agreed 
with this approach.\461\ As Stone writes in his separate evaluation, ``I 
believe the FBI behavioral science experts had worked out a good 
psychological understanding of Koresh's psychopathology. They knew it 
would be a mistake to deal with him as though he were a con-man 
pretending to religious beliefs so that he could exploit his 
followers.'' \462\
    \461\ Edward Dennis summarized the opinions of the experts as 
    On March 3, 1993 the behavioral experts wrote a joint memo 
recommending a strategy of trying to work within the Davidians own 
belief system to talk them out. They recommended acknowledging the 
conspiracy against the Davidians and their right to defend themselves, 
and creating an illusion that Koresh could win in court and in the press 
and would not go to jail. On March 5 behavioral experts wrote a memo 
advising that the negotiation strategy focus on insuring the safety of 
the children and facilitating the peaceful surrender of the Davidians. 
This memo recommended a de-escalation of tactical pressure because 
movement of tactical personnel would validate Koresh's prophesy that his 
followers must die defending their faith. As an alternative tactic, the 
memo recommends that efforts be made to drive a wedge between Koresh and 
his followers by convincing them that a battle is not inevitable.
    Dennis Report at 49.
    \462\ Stone Report at 13.
    Smerick coauthored six memoranda on David Koresh based on Koresh's 
past behavior and listening to negotiations. In each of the early 
memoranda, Smerick proposed that the FBI approach the Davidians with 
caution and avoid provocation. Smerick said that the cautionary 
memoranda were written expressly because ``the FBI commanders were 
moving too rapidly toward a tactical solution, and were not allowing 
adequate time for negotiations to work.'' \463\ In his final memorandum, 
Smerick proposed ``'other measures' . . . because negotiations had met 
with only limited success.'' \464\ As the Justice Department Report 
maintains, ``those other measures included sporadically terminating and 
reinstating of utilities; moving equipment and manpower suddenly; 
downplaying the importance of Koresh in the daily press conferences; 
controlling television and radio reception inside the compound; and 
cutting off negotiations with Koresh.'' \465\ Although these suggested 
measures are exactly the tactics the FBI used in Waco, Smerick suggests 
that while the ``negotiators were building bonds . . . the tactical 
group was undermining everything.'' \466\ Smerick continued, ``[e]very 
time the negotiators were making progress the tactical people would undo 
it.'' \467\
    \463\ Justice Department Report at 182.
    \464\ Id.
    \465\ Id.
    \466\ U.S. Dept. of Justice, record of interview of Peter Smerick 
(August 24, 1993).

    During the hearings before the subcommittees, Smerick was questioned 
about this abrupt change in his advice; and whether senior Justice 
Department officials pressured him to change his advice to match the 
course of action preferred by the on-scene commanders. Smerick testified 
that he felt ``no overt pressure'' \468\ to alter his memoranda. But he 
said that he was aware that the FBI wanted different advice. Smerick 
told the subcommittees:
    \468\ Hearings Part 

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