The Attorney General's Decision to End the Standoff
Activities of Federal Law Enforcement Agencies Toward the Branch Davidians
Report House of Representatives
104th Congress, 2nd Session, Union Calendar No. 395
August 2, 1996
VII. The Attorney General's Decision to End the Stand-off
a. overview of the plan to end the standoff
On April 12, 1993, the FBI presented Attorney General Janet Reno
with a plan to end the standoff with the Branch Davidians. On April 17,
1993, the Attorney General gave her approval for the plan to be
implemented on April 19. The stated mission of the plan was to ``secure
the surrender/arrest of all adult occupants of the residence while
providing the maximum possible security for the children within the
compound.'' A key component of the plan was the decision to use CS, a
chemical riot control agent, which would be sprayed into the Branch
Davidian residence in an attempt to induce the Davidians to leave. The
plan was implemented on April 19, but the Davidians did not leave their
residence as government officials suggested. Instead, 6 hours after the
beginning of the operations, a fire erupted inside the structure,
ultimately consuming it and the more than 70 persons inside.
b. the operation plan for april 19, 1993
1. Overview of the written operation plan to end the standoff
As early as March 22, 1993 the FBI began formulating an operation
plan to end the standoff with the Davidians.\494\ On April 12, 1993, the
FBI presented its plan to the Attorney General for her approval.\495\
According to the Justice Department Report, ``Over the next several days
the Attorney General and Senior Justice Department and FBI officials
discussed, debated and dissected every aspect of the plan.'' \496\
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\494\ U.S. Dept. of Justice, Report to the Attorney General on the
Events at Waco, Texas 79 (1993) [hereinafter Justice Department Report].
Larry Potts, Assistant Director of the FBI in 1993, testified before the
subcommittees that ``[I]n terms of the formation of the gas plan, I
think that Mr. Jamar first contacted me around March 27th or sometime
near the very end of March, to indicate that such a plan was being
submitted [to senior FBI officials].'' Hearings Part 2 at 480.
\495\ Justice Department Report at 263.
\496\ Id.
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The operations plan provided that its mission was to ``secure the
surrender/arrest of all adult occupants of the residence while providing
the maximum possible security for the children within the compound.''
The key component of the plan was the delivery of a chemical riot
control agent, known as CS, into the Branch Davidian residence in order
to induce the Davidians to leave. While the CS agent was being inserted,
FBI officials planned to use a loud speaker system and the telephone to
advise the Davidians that tear gas was being inserted into the residence
to force them to leave, but that an attack was not underway. The plan
also provided for a demand that all subjects leave the building and
surrender to authorities.\497\
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\497\ Federal Bureau of Investigation, Briefing for the Attorney
General, at 25. [See Documents produced to the subcommittees by the
Department of Justice 003370-003480, at Appendix [hereinafter Justice
Documents]. The Appendix is published separately.]
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The plan provided for the operation to last up to 48 hours or until
all subjects had exited the residence and surrendered. The plan provided
for the first insertion of CS agent to be made into the front/left
portion of the residence. After a period of time, which was to be
dependent on the Davidians' response to the initial delivery of the CS
agent and any subsequent negotiations that were possible, an additional
tear gas delivery was to be made into the back/right portion of the
residence. After a third delivery of CS, into an area not specified in
the plan, all subsequent deliveries of CS agent were to be made into the
upper and lower windows of the residence.\498\
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\498\ Id.
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During the first three insertions, the CS agent was to be delivered
into the residence by two combat engineering vehicles (CEV's), an
armored vehicle similar to the Bradley Fighting Vehicle (Bradley), but
which is unarmed. The CEV's at Waco were mounted with boom-like arms
which were capable of penetrating the walls of the structure. Mounted on
the arms of the CEV's were mechanical devices designed to spray a stream
of CS agent into the holes made by the booms. After the third insertions
of CS agent, the operations plan called for agents located in unarmed
Bradley Fighting Vehicles to maneuver close enough to the residence so
that they could fire Ferret round projectiles through the windows of the
structure. These small non-explosive grenade-like projectiles contained
CS agent which would rise into the air when the projectile broke open
upon impact. The use of Ferret rounds was to be in addition to
continuing insertions of CS by agents in the CEV's.
The plan also provided for specific assignments for the different
HRT and SWAT teams involved in the operation. It specified the maneuvers
to be made by the two CEV's, the nine Bradley Fighting Vehicles, and the
M-88 tank retrieval vehicle, and provided for miscellaneous
administrative and logistical issues such as types of uniforms to be
used and the appropriate manner for handling prisoners.
Additionally, the plan provided to the Attorney General on April 12,
1993 included details concerning where the FBI's snipers were to be
positioned and the positioning and capabilities of SWAT team members.
The plan contained a ``medical annex'' providing for a means to treat
``the potentially large number of casualties which could exceed the
current medical capabilities of any single agency present'' as well as
procedures to be followed to arrest persons who had been exposed to CS.
The annex also provided for locations where the injured were to be
treated, provided a list of local and secondary hospitals (including
address, latitude/longitude location, and estimated air travel time).
And the medical annex provided instructions to the agents on the
procedure to handle a mass surrender by the Davidians.
Finally, the plan provided for the possibility that the Davidians
might not surrender. The final contingency provision in the plan stated
that ``if all subjects failed to surrender after 48 hours of tear gas,
then a CEV with a modified blade will commence a systematic opening up/
disassembly of the structure until all subjects are located.''
2. Acceleration provisions of the operations plan
While the operations plan called for the government's actions to end
the standoff to unfold over a period of 2 days, the plan also contained
contingency provisions that allowed for a departure from the concept of
a methodical insertion of CS. One of these provisions was implemented on
April 19 and resulted in a rapid acceleration of the insertion of CS
agent.
The first of the two contingency provisions in the plan provided
that if the Davidians were observed in the tower during the operations,
after having been informed not to be there, agents were permitted to
insert CS gas into the tower by firing Ferret round projectiles into the
tower. More importantly, however, the second contingency provision in
the plan provided:
If during any tear gas delivery operations, subjects open fire
with a weapon, then the FBI rules of engagement will apply and
appropriate deadly force will be used. Additionally, tear gas
will immediately be inserted into all windows of the compound
utilizing the four Bradley Vehicles as well as the CEV's.\499\
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\499\ Id.
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c. the way the plan actually unfolded
At approximately 5:55 a.m., Dick Rogers, commander of the FBI's
Hostage Rescue Team, ordered the two CEV's, which were to insert the CS
riot control agent, deployed to the compound. At 5:56 a.m., the FBI's
chief day-to-day negotiator, Byron Sage, telephoned the residence and
asked to speak with Davidian Steve Schneider. It took approximately 3
minutes for someone to come to the phone.\500\ At 5:59 a.m., Sage
informed the person answering the telephone that ``We are in the process
of putting tear gas into the building. This is not an assault. We will
not enter the building.'' The person on the other end of the telephone
responded ``You are going to spray tear gas into the building?''
whereupon Sage replied, ``In the building . . . no, we are not entering
the building.'' \501\ While the Justice Department Report is ambiguous
on the person to whom Sage was speaking, Sage testified at the hearings
before the subcommittees that the person he talked with was
Schneider.\502\ At the conclusion of this conversation, someone threw
the telephone outside of the building.\503\
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\500\ Justice Department Report at 285.
\501\ Justice Department Report at 286.
\502\ Hearings Part 3 at 269.
\503\ Justice Department Report at 286.
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From 6 a.m. to approximately noon on April 19, 1993, FBI agents
implemented the operations plan and injected a large quantity of CS riot
control agent into the Branch Davidian residence in four distinct
phases. The agents moved close to the Davidian residence in CEV's
equipped with devices \504\ which could shoot a horizontal stream of CS
agent in short bursts or continuously for up to 15 seconds.\505\ The
device uses carbon dioxide as a disbursant to propel a stream of CS
agent, suspended in methylene chloride, horizontally into the air. Once
the CS stream is fired, the carbon dioxide quickly evaporates and the
methylene chloride gas disperses the CS evenly through a room, until the
methylene chloride itself evaporates. The CS agent, which is a fine
powder, then slowly falls to the floor, where it remains. The capacity
of each delivery system on the CEV's was 30 grams of CS agent.
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\504\ The delivery systems mounted on the CEV's were Protecto-jet
Model 5 Tear Gas Delivery Systems manufactured by ISPRA, Ltd., an
Israeli company. The systems were sold to the FBI by Advanced Materials
Laboratories, Inc. of Forrest Hills, NY. The Justice Department Report
refers to the systems as Mark V systems. See Justice Department Report
at 287. The subcommittees investigation indicates that while the Mark V
system does exist, there is no evidence that it was used at Waco. The
evidence indicates that only the Protecto-jet Model 5 system was mounted
on the CEV's furnished to the FBI by the Defense Department. The
references to the Mark V system in the Justice Department Report appear
to be in error.
\505\ The Protecto-jet Model 5 system consists of a cylinder
approximately 27 inches long, 4\1/8\ inches in diameter, weighing
approximately 16 lbs., which is connected to a hose with a nozzle. The
device uses carbon dioxide to propel a chemical agent, such as CS, mixed
in a suspension of methylene chloride, into the air. The range of the
device is 15-20 yards in still air. The device can be used to shoot 13-
17 1-second bursts or a continuous burst for up to 15 seconds.
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The insertion of CS agent into the Branch Davidian residence was
performed in four phases. The first two phases employed two CEV's. On
one CEV was mounted two CS delivery systems, while four systems were
mounted on the second CEV. The CEV's were operated in tandem, each
inserting the entire contents of the six CS agent delivery systems
during the first two phases of the operation, at 6 a.m. and again at
approximately 8 a.m. In each of the first two phases, a total of 180
grams of CS was delivered. The third and fourth phases, also 2 hours
apart, involved only one CEV, as the second CEV had experienced
mechanical difficulties and no longer operated. Four cylinders of CS
were delivered in each of these two phases, for a total 120 grams of CS
inserted into the residence. Thus, over the entire 6 hours of the
operation, a total of 600 grams of CS agent was inserted into the Branch
Davidian residence.
During the standoff with the Davidians, FBI agents used unarmed
Bradley Fighting Vehicles as a means of transportation while guarding
the perimeter of the residence. The FBI's overall operational plan for
April 19 provided for the Bradleys to be used in a contingency plan to
be implemented in the event the Davidians began to fire on the CEV's. If
that occurred, agents in Bradleys who had maneuvered close to the
building and were standing ready were to insert additional quantities of
CS agent into all parts of the building. Agents in the Bradleys were to
fire Ferret round projectiles into the residence. Ferret rounds \506\
resemble large plastic bullets, and are fired from hand-held grenade
launchers. Each projectile carries 3.7 grams of CS agent, mixed in a
suspension of methylene chloride.
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\506\ Ferret Rounds are 37, 38, and 40 millimeter projectiles which
can be fired from hand-held grenade launchers. Each projectile carries
3.7 grams of CS riot control agent, mixed in a suspension of methylene
chloride.
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Once the Davidians began firing on the CEV's Rogers gave the order
to implement the contingency plan. The agents in the Bradleys then
maneuvered close to the Branch Davidian residence and began to fire the
Ferret round projectiles through the windows of the building. During the
6-hour operation, 400 Ferret round projectiles were fired at the Branch
Davidian residence, a number of projectiles struck the side of the
building and did not enter the building. Estimates of the number of
projectiles that actually entered the residence range from 300 to 380.
Had all 400 projectiles fired at the residence actually entered the
residence, however, the total quantity of CS agent delivered by the
Ferret round projectiles would have been 1,480 grams.
d. overview of the use of cs chemical agent
1. Introduction
Chlorobenzylidene malononitrile, commonly called CS, is one of a
family of approximately 15 chemical compounds used to control civilian
populations during periods of disturbance and unrest. These ``riot-
control agents'' cause acute irritation to the eyes, mouth, nose, and
upper respiratory tract, that is relatively brief and not usually
accompanied by permanent toxic effects. Exposure to riot-control agents
renders the victim temporarily incapacitated, but the symptoms typically
persist for only a few minutes after cessation of exposure.\507\
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\507\ F.W. Beswick, Chemical Agents Used in Riot-Control and
Warfare, 2 Hum. Toxicology 247-256.
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The first riot control agent was developed in the early 1900's.\508\
In 1928, two chemists, Corson and Stoughton, developed 2-
chlorobenzylidene malononitrile, code named CS. However, CS was not
developed as riot-control agent until the 1950's, when the British War
Office began to search for a chemical that was more potent than either
CA or CN.\509\ By the 1960's, CS had replaced CN as the preferred tear
gas among police authorities around the world. Its popularity stemmed
from the fact that it was shown to be a more potent irritant than CN,
and appeared to cause less long-term injury, particularly to the
eye.\510\ Military forces also saw CS as a potent weapon for particular
operations. Large quantities of CS were used by the United States during
the Vietnam War. CN is no longer used by the U.S. military operations,
but it is still used by some civil authorities, and by individuals for
self-defense. Among civilian law enforcement agencies CS is, by far, the
most widely-used riot control agent.
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\508\ The first riot-control agent may have been ethyl bromacetate,
which was used by the Paris police in a hand grenade to disable criminal
gangs. The German chemical industry that produced many lethal chemical
weapons during World War I (e.g., nerve gases) also developed new tear
gases. For example, xylyl bromide was packed in 150-mm artillery shells
and used during the battle against the Russians at Bolimow in January
1915. This early military use of a tear gas was not judged to be a
success, owing to the failure of the chemical to vaporize in the sub-
zero temperatures on the battlefield. However, it provided an early
indication of the importance of weather conditions to the effectiveness
of these agents. By 1918, the French had developed bromobenzylcyanide,
known by the military code CA, and the British and Americans had
developed chloroacetophenone, known by the military code CN, which
became the most effective and widely used tear gas. In the postwar
period, the urban crime wave and emergence of gangsters in the 1920's in
the United States spurred renewed efforts to develop riot-control
agents. By the mid-1920's, small explosive cartridges containing CN were
available over the counter for personal protection. CN rapidly became
the tear gas of choice for law-enforcement authorities. Howard Hu,
Toxicodynamics of Riot-Control Agents (Lacriminators) 271, 273 in
Chemical Warfare Agents (Satu M. Somani ed., 1992).
\509\ J. Cookson and J. Nottingham, A Survey of Chemical and
Biological Warfare (1969).
\510\ Hu, supra note 508.
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2. Concerns over use of CS
CS has gained wide acceptance as a means of controlling and subduing
riotous crowds. However, its widespread use has raised questions about
its safety. Most published studies have concluded that, if used
correctly, the irritant effects of exposure are short-lived and do not
cause permanent damage.\511\ However, there have been isolated reports
of fatalities from the use of riot control agents. The most common
reports involve deaths attributed to the use of riot control agents by
American miltary personnel in Vietnam.\512\ Additionally, other reports
involve injury and death from the use of CS in Chile, Panama, South
Korea, and the Gaza Strip and West Bank of Israel.\513\ It has been
unclear from these reports, however, whether the riot control agent used
was CS or another, more toxic, agent.\514\ Of particular concern,
however, has been the indiscriminate use of riot control agents in
enclosed and indoor spaces where it is feared that resulting high
concentrations may have resulted in harmful levels of exposure. Severe
injuries from exploding tear gas grenades as well as deaths from the
toxicity of riot control agents used in confined, indoor spaces have
been reported.
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\511\ The most thorough study of the use of CS agent against humans
is the Himsworth Report, which investigated the use of CS agent in
Northern Ireland in 1969. It concluded that exposure to CS did not
produce long-term injury or death in humans. Home Office, report of the
enquiry into the Medical and Toxicological aspects of CS (Ortho-
chlorobenzylidene malononitrile), Part II: Inquiry into Toxicological
Aspects of CS and its use for Civil Purposes (1971) [hereinafter
Himsworth Report]. A recent study of the use of CS on 1,500 persons in a
confined area space made the same findings. P.J. Anderson et al., Acute
effects of the potent lacrimator o-chlorobenzylidene malonitrile (CS)
tear gas, 15 Hum. & Experimental Toxicology 461, 464-465 (1996).
\512\ The United States used large amounts of CS during the Vietnam
War in both offensive and defensive military operations. The basic
doctrine for the use of CS weapons by U.S. sources is summarized in the
following passage taken from a 1969 Army training circular:
The employment of riot-control agents (CS, CN) in Counter guerilla
operations is most feasible in tactical situations characterized by
close combat in which rapidly responding systems are essential and
permanent effects are undesirable. Riot-control munitions can be used
tactically to temporarily disable hostile troops, to suppress their
fire, or to cause them to abandon their position. Offensively, riot-
control agents can be used to ``flush out'' unprotected enemy troops
from concealed positions or to reduce their ability to maneuver or use
their weapons. Defensively, riot-control munitions can be integrated
into defensive perimeters to provide rapid CS delivery in case of enemy
attack.
CS was employed for defensive purposes such as in the event of a
surprise attack from superior enemy forces, and to help secure
helicopter extractions of combat units or downed airman. It was used
extensively in area-denial operations to render terrain uninhabitable by
the enemy. CS was also used routinely in direct engagement of the enemy
during offensive combat operations.
U.S. forces were issued gas masks to protect themselves against use
of CS and other tear gases by the enemy. According to one U.S.
evaluation, the North Vietnamese had only a limited supply of tear gas,
but they used it to good effect. During the conflict, the general
service respirator was replaced by a lighter mask, which went through a
number of further modifications. The protection which it conferred was
adequate but not complete, because dense CS aerosols can have a strong
irritant effect on bare skin, especially in hot and humid conditions
when the skin is moist.
\513\ See generally, H. Jack Geiger & Robert M. Cook-Deegan, The
Role of Physicians in Conflicts and Humanitarian Crises, Case Studies
from the Field Missions of Physicians for Human Rights, 1988 to 1993,
270 JAMA 616 (1993).
\514\ In a 1989 report, the General Accounting Office noted that the
group Physicians for Human Rights had conducted a fact-finding trip to
investigate allegations of deaths from the use of CS in the occupied
territories but that the members of the group could not confirm that any
of the reported deaths were attributable to tear gas inhalation. See
e.g., U.S. General Accounting Office, Isreal: Use of U.S.--Manufactured
Tear Gas in the Occupied Territories 3 (1989) (citing Physicians for
Human Rights, ``The Casualties of Conflict: Medical Care and Human
Rights in the West Bank and Gaza Strip,'' Report of a Medical Fact
Finding Mission by Physicians for Human Rights (1988)). The GAO report
also noted that while Amnesty International had reported concerns over a
``pattern of death [that] appeared to follow expose to high
concentrations of tear gas'' they also stated that ``Amnesty
International noted that it was in no position to verify the exact cause
of death in every case.'' Id. at 4.
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Critics of the use of these agents argue that the available
toxicological data is insufficient to describe with any confidence the
potential for long-term pulmonary, carcinogenic, and reproductive
effects. One recently published review of the toxicological data on riot
control agents concluded that relatively little has been published in
the mainstream medical literature and that epidemiologic studies
following tear gas use under actual field conditions are almost
nonexistent. The author of this review wrote:
There is clearly a great need for openly conducted research
illuminating the full health consequences of exposure to riot-
control agents including outcomes such as tumor formation,
reproductive effects, and pulmonary disease. Consideration must
be given to the possible effects of these agents on the young,
the elderly, and other persons who might have increased
susceptibility.\515\
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\515\ Hu, supra note 508, at 284-285.
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e. clinical effects and toxicity of cs
1. Common effects of exposure to CS
All riot control agents, including CS, produce intense sensory
irritation even in the most minute concentrations. For most of these
agents, the eye is the most sensitive organ, with pain arising rapidly,
accompanied by conjunctivitis, excessive tearing, and uncontrolled
blinking. The inside of the mouth and nose experience a stinging or
burning sensation, and there is usually excessive discharge of nasal
mucus. Chest tightness and burning are accompanied by coughing,
sneezing, and increased secretions from the respiratory passageways. A
burning sensation is felt on the skin, often followed by inflammation
and redness, and in some cases, actual burning of the skin occurs. Tear
gas exposure may also irritate the stomach, leading to vomiting and
possibly diarrhea. In addition to the physical symptoms, panic and
severe agitation are common among those individuals with no prior
experience of exposure to tear gas.\516\
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\516\ See generally Id. at 276; Anderson, supra note 511, at 461.
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Most of the symptoms are felt within 10 to 30 seconds after exposure
to the agent. After cessation of exposure, however, most symptoms
continue to persist for a period of minutes before subsiding and
disappearing.\517\ The effects of expose vary among individuals.
Additionally, weather conditions, such as temperature and humidity, can
heighten the potency of these agents.\518\
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\517\ Hu, supra note 508, at 276.
\518\ Id. at 277.
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2. Toxicity of CS
A review of the scientific literature concerning the use of CS
indicates that limited conclusions as to the toxicity and lethality of
CS are known. It seems generally accepted by the scientific community
that the concentration of CS agent which is noticeable by humans and
which will provoke physical responses in humans is 4 milligrams per
cubic meter (4 mg/m\3\).\519\ While no studies on humans have been
conducted concerning the lethality of CS, several studies have projected
the concentrations at which CS is lethal to humans from the effects of
studies performed on animals. Those studies estimate that the
concentration of CS agent which would prove lethal to 50 percent of any
given human population ranges from as low as 25,000 \520\ to as high as
150,000 mg-min/m\3\.\521\ Recent estimates by the U.S. military,
however, estimate that the lethal concentration for humans is 61,000 mg-
min/m\3\.\522\ That study projects that the concentrations which would
be injurious to the health of approximately 50 percent of any human
population range from between 10-20 mg-min/m\3\.\523\
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\519\ Bryan Ballantyne, Riot Control Agents, Biomedical and Health
Aspects of the Use of Chemicals in Civil Disturbances 27 (1977); Hu,
supra note 508, at 279.
\520\ Dow Chemical Co., Material Data Safety Sheet (1988);
Ballantyne, supra note 519.
\521\ Id.
\522\ Headquarters, Departments of the Army, Navy, and the Air
Force, Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds 59
(1989).
\523\ Id.
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It is important to note, however, that there are no published
studies which find that any human death has been caused by exposure to
CS agent. While a number of unverified reports of human deaths can be
found in the literature, in all of these reports it is unclear precisely
whether CS or some other, more toxic, riot control agent was used or
whether some other circumstance could have caused the deaths. The most
extensive study of the use of CS agent on humans, by United Kingdom
forces in Northern Ireland in the late 1960's, found that no deaths (and
no long-term injuries) resulted from the widespread use of CS agent
there.\524\ The only other documented study of the effects of CS used on
a large number of humans confirms this finding.\525\
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\524\ Himsworth Report, supra note 511, at 23-25.
\525\ Anderson, supra note 511, at 464-465.
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Some people may find curious the fact that all of these studies (and
similar studies on the effects of chemical agents) uniformly give
estimates of the level at which CS is lethal or injurious to 50 percent
of a given population of humans. It appears from the literature that the
effect of CS on humans (and on other animals) is not ``linear,'' i.e.,
that proportionately greater concentrations do not have equally
proportionate increases in effect. While scientists can estimate the
levels which would prove lethal to 50 percent of a given population, it
would be incorrect to presume that half of that quantity would kill 25
percent of that population. In fact, the most well-known study of the
effects of CS on humans estimates that the likelihood of death after
exposure to a dose of CS that is one-tenth the estimated lethal does is
less than 1 in 100,000.\526\ Accordingly, any analysis of the lethality
of the CS agent used in the concentrations that resulted on April 19 can
only be performed in light of the 50 percent lethality estimates.
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\526\ Himsworth Report, supra note 511, at 55-56; Ballantyne, supra
note 519, at 30.
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Even when the quantities of CS riot control agent used do not reach
lethal toxic levels, there are, nevertheless, significant physical
consequences that occur from exposure to CS, and often severe emotional
reactions caused by the symptoms brought on from exposure to CS. As
discussed above, one recent study of the use of large quantities of CS
against a population unable to leave the area in which the CS was used
indicated that first, second, and even third degree burns are possible
when skin is exposed to CS.\527\ Additionally, some studies have shown
that exposure to CS can cause allergic contact dermatitis.\528\ Other
studies have shown that when CS can cause severe gastroenteritis when
ingested, whether directly or as a result of ingesting mucus secretions
containing CS from oral inhalation.\529\
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\527\ Anderson, supra note 511, at 463-464.
\528\ Hu, supra note 508, at 280.
\529\ Id.
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Additionally, some studies on animals have suggested that exposure
to CS might cause cancer and genetic abnormalities.\530\ Some studies
have stated that exposure to high concentrations of CS for prolong
periods could result in inflammatory changes in the respiratory tract
that might be conducive to secondary respiratory infection.\531\ And it
is believed that CS may exacerbate existing medical conditions of
persons with bronchitis or asthma, although no reports of death from
these conditions exist.
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\530\ Id.
\531\ Ballantyne, supra note 519, at 30.
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f. effect of the cs and methylene chloride in the quantities used on
april 19th
1. Lethality of CS as used at Waco
Testimony before the subcommittees presented contradictory evidence
on the effects of CS riot control agent. The published literature
described above, however, is more consistent in the conclusions drawn.
While it cannot be concluded with certainty, it is unlikely that the CS
riot control agent, in the quantities used by the FBI, reached lethal
toxic levels. The evidence presented to the subcommittees does indicate,
however, that CS insertion into the enclosed bunker at a time when women
and children were assembled inside that enclosed space could have been a
proximate cause of or directly resulted in some or all of the deaths
attributed to asphyxiation in the autopsy reports.
In order to answer the question of whether the quantities of CS
agent inserted into the residence might have reached lethal levels, the
subcommittees attempted to determine the concentrations that were
present in the residence under the ``worst-case'' circumstances. To make
this determination, a number of assumptions must be made. Many of these
assumptions were overstated solely for the purpose of calculation in
order to place the greatest scrutiny on the government's actions.
In each of the first two phases of insertion into the Branch
Davidian residence, a total of 180 grams (180,000 mgs) of CS was
delivered.\532\ For the purposes of analysis, the subcommittees assumed
an ``extreme case'' scenario, where all 180 grams were delivered into
the building by the two CEV's at the same instant, and that one-quarter
of the Ferret rounds fired at the residence were fired at the precise
moment that the CS delivered by the CEV's entered the residence.\533\ If
so, then during the first and second phases of the CS operation, 550
grams (550,000 mgs) of CS were delivered to the residence.\534\ During
the first and second phases, therefore, the total concentration of CS
delivered into the compound was 108.92 mgs/m\3\.\535\ During the third
and fourth phases, due to the mechanical failure of the second CEV, only
490 grams (490,000 mgs) of CS agent was delivered into the
residence.\536\ During each of the third and fourth phases the total
concentration at the (assumed) moment of insertion was 97.04 mgs/
m\3\.\537\
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\532\ CEV-1 emptied its four 30-gram cylinders while CEV-2 emptied
the contents of its two 30-gram cylinders. The total delivered was thus
(4 x 30) + (2 x 30) = 180 grams.
\533\ Each Ferret round carried 3.7 grams of CS agent. A total of
400 Ferret rounds were fired at the residence. Thus, the total quantity
of CS agent in one quarter of the Ferret rounds used was 370 grams (3.7
x 100).
\534\ On each of the first two phases, 180 grams of CS agent was
delivered by the CEV's and approximately 370 grams was delivered by
Ferret Rounds. This totals 550 grams, or 550,000 milligrams.
\535\ The Branch Davidian residence contained approximately 178,310
cubic feet of living area. Converted into meters, the volume of the
residence was 5,049.7 cubic meters. The concentration inside the
building, therefore, was 108.92 mgs/m\3\ (550,000 mgs/5,049.7m\3\ =
108.92 mgs/m\3\).
\536\ The 180 grams from CEV-1 and the approximately 370 grams from
100 of the Ferret Rounds totals 490 grams, or 490,000 milligrams.
\537\ 490,000 mgs/5049.7 m\3\ = 97.04 mgs/m\3\.
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Assuming the Branch Davidian residence been air-tight, so that none
of the CS agent escaped the building (which was not the case), the total
amount of CS agent delivered present in the building would have been
411.92 mgs/m\3\.\538\ This concentration is far below the 61,000 mgs/
m\3\ amount projected to be lethal to 50 percent of a given population
of humans. Stated in another way, it would take a concentration of CS
148 times greater than the greatest amount that could have been present
at the Branch Davidian residence on April 19 to reach that lethal level.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\538\ The concentration inside the building, therefore, was 108.92
mgs/m\3\ + 108.92 mgs/m\3\ + 97.04 mgs/m\3\ + 97.04 mgs/m\3\ = 411.92
mgs/m\3\).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In reality, the concentrations of CS inside the Branch Davidian
residence did not reach even these levels. The Branch Davidian residence
was a poorly constructed structure which allowed for air to move in and
out of the residence continuously. The air circulation carried some of
the CS agent out of the building. Adding to the air circulation inside
the Davidians residence that day was the fact that the FBI began to use
the CEV's to ram openings into the building, ostensibly to create a
means of escape for the Davidians and, later, to ``deconstruct''
portions of the structure in an effort to prevent the Davidians from
occupying those areas of the residence. These actions greatly enhanced
the circulation into the residence and further depleted the
concentration of CS agent inside the residence. Additionally, on April
19th, the winds were gusting up to 25 mph.\539\ This fact greatly
enhanced the air circulation inside the residence, adding to the
dissipation of the concentration of CS agent in the residence. Thus, the
actual levels of CS inside the Davidian residence were less than those
calculated above.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\539\ The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration recorded
high winds beginning at noon on April 18, 1993. The winds continued
through April 19. At 11:52 a.m. on April 19, winds were recorded at 25
mph with gusts to 30 mph.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Some who have contacted the subcommittees have suggested that the
above analysis is flawed because it does not allow for the possibility
that some CS agent was concentrated in certain areas of the residence
rather than being evenly distributed throughout the entire structure.
The subcommittees believe that it is important to address that
possibility.
Because the largest group of bodies recovered after the fire was
found in the area of the residence commonly known as the gun room or
bunker \540\ consideration was given to the concentrations of CS in that
area.\541\ The bunker was a solid concrete room inside the Davidian
residence. It had no windows or other access to the outside of the
building, but did open into a hallway inside the residence. It appears
that there was little opportunity for CS to have been directly sprayed
into the bunker and that any CS that was present in the bunker likely
drifted into that room after it was sprayed into one or more of the
rooms along the outside of the structure. The subcommittees note,
however, that the videotape of the insertion of CS on April 19 indicates
that one of the CEV's drove into the structure near the bunker during
the fourth phase of the CS insertion. If the door to the bunker had been
open at that time, it is possible that CS might have been injected
directly into the bunker.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\540\ See Justice Documents at the Appendix for a diagram of the
floorplan of the Branch Davidian residence.
\541\ It should be noted, however, that none of the autopsies of the
persons found in the bunker indicate the cause of death was from
exposure to CS.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Based on this possibility the subcommittees attempted to determine,
as a worst case scenario, the concentration of CS that would have been
present in that room had the CEV emptied the entire contents of one of
its CS containers into the bunker. It appears, however, that even in
that event the concentration of CS would not have reached lethal levels.
The volume of the bunker room was approximately 44.40 cubic meters.
Assuming that an entire cylinder (30 grams) of CS was injected into the
room, the concentration at that moment would have been 675.67 mgs/
m\3\.\542\ As discussed above, the concentration level estimated to be
lethal to humans is 61,000 mgs-min/m\3\. Even had the CEV which was
mounted with four containers of CS inserted the contents of all four
containers into the bunker, the resulting concentration would have been
2,702.70 mgs/m\3\.\543\ Again, this figure is well below the
concentration level estimated to be lethal to humans.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\542\ Each cylinder of CS contained 30 grams, or 30,000 milligrams,
of CS. 30,000 mgs/44.40 m\3\ = 675.67 mgs/m\3\.
\543\ 120,000 mgs/44.4 m\3\ = 2,702.70 mgs/m\3\.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Another worse case scenario considered by the subcommittees was the
possibility that one of the CEV's might have delivered the entire
contents of one of its cylinders of CS agent into one of the smallest
rooms of the residence, and that that room was inhabited at the time. It
still appears that the concentration of CS would not have reached lethal
levels. The smallest rooms in the structure were the women's quarters
located on the second floor of the residence. The smallest of these had
a total volume of 16.17 cubic meters. Assuming that an entire cylinder
of CS had been injected into this room, the concentration at that moment
would have been 1855.29 mgs/m\3\.\544\ Assuming further that a number of
Ferret rounds also happened to be fired into the room at the exact
moment that the CS was injected by the CEV (assume an impossible event
such as 20 rounds entering the room at the same instant), the
concentration at that instant would have been 6,431.66 mgs/m\3\.\545\
Again, these figures fall far below the concentrations estimated to be
lethal to humans.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\544\ Each cylinder of CS agent contained 30 grams, or 30,000
milligrams. 30,000 mgs/16.17 m\3\ = 185.52 mgs/m\3\.
\545\ 30 grams of CS agent from a CEV plus 74 grams of CS agent from
20 Ferret rounds is a total of 104 grams (30 + (3.7 x 20) = 104), or
104,000 milligrams. 104,000 mgs/16.17 m\3\ = 6,431.66 mgs/m\3\.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While concluding that it is unlikely that the CS reached toxic
levels, the subcommittees note the level of exposure to CS experienced
by an individual Davidian cannot be determined. It is possible that a
person near one of the CEV's injecting the CS may have been subject to a
level of CS that was high enough to cause death. Additionally, 10 of the
autopsies indicate asphyxiation as the cause of death, but do not
indicate whether CS or other factors may have lead to this. The
subcommittees are unable to conclude that CS did not play a part in the
deaths of these persons.
2. Lethality of methylene chloride used with CS at Waco
During the gassing operation, each cylinder of the CS riot control
agent introduced into the Branch Davidian residence by the CEV's was
mixed with approximately 1,070 grams of methylene chloride. This
suspension was then dispersed into the structure by carbon dioxide,
which almost immediately evaporated, leaving the suspension of CS and
methylene chloride. Additionally, each of the Ferret round projectiles
contained 33 grams of methylene chloride as the dispersant medium for
the CS agent.
The four phases of insertion of CS agent into the Branch Davidian
residence were conducted approximately 2 hours apart. During the first
and second phases six cylinders of CS agent were inserted into the
residence, delivering approximately 6,420 grams of methylene chloride in
each phase.\546\ During the third and fourth insertions only four
cylinders of CS agent were inserted, accounting for approximately 4,280
grams of methylene chloride during each insertion. Assuming a worse case
scenario of all of the CS insertions in one phase occurring at the same
moment and approximately \1/4\ of the Ferret round projectiles entering
the building at that same time, thus adding an additional 3,300 grams of
methylene chloride in each phase,\547\ the total concentration of
methylene chloride delivered into the building during the first and
second insertions was 1,924.87 mgs/m\3\.\548\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\546\ Each cylinder contained 1,070 grams of methelyene chloride.
Six cylinders totaled 9,720 grams.
\547\ Each Ferret round contained 33 grams of methylene chloride.
One hundred Ferret rounds thus inserted 3,300 grams of the chemical into
the building.
\548\ In the first two phases the total quantity of methylene
chloride delivered was 9,720 grams ((6 x 1,070) + (100 x 33)) or
9,720,000 milligrams. Divided by the cubic footage of the building
(5,049.7 m\3\) the distribution of the substance throughout the building
in these phases was 1,924.87 mgs/m\3\. In the third and fourth two
phases the total quantity of methylene chloride delivered was 7,580
grams ((4 x 1,070) + (100 x 33)) or 7,580,000 milligrams. Divided by the
cubic footage of the building (5,049.7 m\3\) the distribution of the
substance throughout the building in these phases was 1,501.08 mgs/m\3\.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A review of the scientific literature concerning CS agent has
located no estimates of the concentration of methylene chloride which
would prove harmful or lethal to humans. The only estimates which do
exist are with respect to mice and rats. For example, the concentration
that would prove lethal to 50 percent of a rat population is estimated
to be 2,640,000 mgs-min/m\3\.\549\ As can be seen from the above
figures, therefore, the total concentrations of methylene chloride at
the Davidian residence on that day were less than the concentrations
that would prove lethal to even rats.\550\ It appears, therefore, that
the methylene chloride used with the CS agent could not have caused the
death of any of the Davidians.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\549\ See generally Mallinckrodt, Inc., Material Data Safety Sheet 2
(1989); Dow Chemical, Inc., Material Data Safety Sheet 3 (1988).
\550\ The total quantities from each of the four insertions of CS
agent was only 5,356.74 mgs/m\3\. ((2 x 1,924.87) + (2 x 1,501.08) =
5,356.74).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As in the case with CS, the subcommittees considered the possibility
that some methylene chloride was concentrated in certain areas of the
residence rather than being evenly distributed throughout the entire
structure. Because the largest group of bodies recovered after the fire
was found in the area of the residence commonly known as the gun room or
bunker, consideration was given to the concentrations of methylene
chloride in that area.\551\ As discussed above, the bunker was a solid
concrete room with no windows or other access to the outside of the
building, but did open into a hallway inside the residence. Again, it
appears that there was little opportunity for the methylene chloride
carrying the CS agent to have been directly sprayed into the bunker and
that any methylene chloride that was present in the bunker likely
drifted into that room after it was sprayed into one or more of the
rooms along the outside of the structure. But the subcommittees again
note that the videotape of the insertion of CS on April 19 indicates
that one of the CEV's drove into the structure near the bunker during
the fourth phase of the CS insertion. If the door to the bunker had been
open at that time, it is possible that methylene chloride carrying the
CS agent might have been injected directly into the bunker.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\551\ It should be noted, however, that none of the autopsies of the
persons found in the bunker indicate the cause of death was from
exposure to methylene chloride.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Based on this possibility the subcommittees attempted to determine,
as a worst case scenario, the concentration of methylene chloride that
would have been present in that room had the CEV emptied the entire
contents of one of its CS containers into the bunker. It appears,
however, that even in that event the concentration of CS would not have
reached lethal levels.
The volume of the bunker room was approximately 44.40 cubic meters.
Assuming that an entire cylinder of CS (with 1,070 grams of methylene
chloride as a disbursant) was injected into the room, the concentration
at that moment would have been 24,099 mgs/m\3\.\552\ Even if the CEV
that was mounted with four cylinders of CS inserted the contents of all
four containers into the bunker, the resulting concentration would have
been 96,396 mgs/m\3\.\553\ Both of these figures are well below the
concentrations estimated to be lethal to rats.\554\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\552\ Each cylinder of CS contained 1,070 grams, or 1,070,000
milligrams, of methylene chloride. 1,070,000 mgs/ 44.40 m\3\ = 214,099
mgs/m\3\.
\553\ 4,280,000 mgs/ 44.40 m\3\ = 96,396 mgs/m\3\.
\554\ As stated, there are no studies estimating the lethal
concentration levels to humans of exposure to methylene chloride.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Another worse case scenario considered by the subcommittees was the
possibility that one of the CEV's might have delivered the entire
contents of one of its cylinders of CS agent into one of the smallest
rooms of the residence, and that that room was inhabited at the time. It
still appears that the concentration of methylene chloride would not
have reached lethal levels. The smallest rooms in the structure were the
women's quarters located on the second floor of the residence. The
smallest of these had a total volume of 16.17 cubic meters. Assuming
that an entire cylinder of CS had been injected into this room, the
concentration of methylene chloride at that moment would have been
66,171.93 mgs/m\3\.\555\ Assuming further that a number of Ferret rounds
also happened to be fired into the room at the exact moment that the CS
was injected by the CEV (assume, for example, an event as unlikely as 20
rounds entering the room at the same instant), the concentration at that
instant would have been 106,988 mgs/m\3\.\556\ Again, these figures fall
far below the concentrations estimated to be lethal to rats.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\555\ Each cylinder of CS agent contained 1,070 grams of methylene
chloride, or 1,070,000 milligrams. 1,070,000 mgs/ 16.17 m\3\ = 66,171
mgs/m\3\.
\556\ 1,070 grams of methylene chloride from a CEV plus 660 grams of
methylene chloride from 20 Ferret rounds is a total of 1,730 grams
(1,070 + (33 x 20) = 1,730), or 1,730,000 milligrams. 1,730,000 mgs/
16.17 m\3\ = 106,988 mgs/m\3\.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. Other possible effects of methylene chloride used with CS at Waco
While the subcommittees conclude that the levels of methylene
chloride did not reach lethal toxic levels, the subcommittees also
considered whether the levels of methylene chloride may have affected
the Davidians in other ways. At levels over 1,000 parts per million
(ppm) anaesthetic effects begin to occur in humans.\557\ At levels above
2,300 ppm, exposure to methylene chloride may cause dizziness.\558\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\557\ 2 G. Clayton & F. Clayton, Patty's Industrial Hygiene and
Toxicology 3449-3455 (1981); R. Stewart et al., Methylene Chloride:
Development of a Biological Standard for Industrial Workers by Breath
Analysis (1974).
\558\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Because methylene chloride evaporates rapidly when released into the
air, the subcommittees considered separately the concentrations of
methylene chloride during each of the four phases of the CS agent
insertion. The levels of methylene chloride were greatest during the
first two phases (because one of the CEV's was unable to inject the CS
agent/methylene chloride mixture during the third and fourth phase).
During the first and second phases, six cylinders of CS agent were
inserted into the residence, delivering approximately 6,420 grams of
methylene chloride in each phase.\559\ Assuming that all of the CS
inserted by the CEV's during one phase was inserted at a single moment,
and that approximately \1/4\ of the Ferret round projectiles used during
the entire operation also entering the building at that same time (thus
adding an additional 3,300 grams of methylene chloride in each phase
\560\), and that the Davidian residence was airtight, the concentration
of methylene chloride during each of the first two phases would have
been 548 ppm.\561\ At this concentration, studies have shown no
observable effects in humans.\562\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\559\ Each cylinder contained 1,070 grams of methylene chloride. Six
cylinders totaled 9,720 grams.
\560\ Each Ferret round contained 33 grams of methylene chloride.
One hundred Ferret rounds thus inserted 3,300 grams of the chemical into
the building.
\561\ The molecular weight of methylene chloride gas is 85. One mole
of methylene chloride gas is 24.2 liters. 9,720g MC/ 85 = 114 moles. 114
moles x 24.2 liters/mole = 2758 liters of MC. There was 5,049,700 liters
of volume in the Davidian residence (5.049.7 m\3\ x 1000 liters/m\3\ =
5,049,700). Thus 2767.34/ 5,049,700 x 10\6\ = 548 ppm.
\562\ U.S. Dept. Of Commerce, Agency for Toxic Substances and
Disease Registry, Toxicological Profile for Methylene Chloride (1993).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In considering the possibility that some methylene chloride was
concentrated in certain areas of the residence, rather than being evenly
distributed throughout the entire structure, the subcommittees found
that it was possible that the levels of methylene chloride reached
concentrations that might have caused levels that produced an
anaesthetic effects in humans.
Again, the subcommittees considered the possible concentration in
the bunker, as the largest group of bodies recovered after the fire was
found there. The volume of the bunker room was approximately 44.40 cubic
meters. Assuming that an entire cylinder of CS (with 1,070 grams of
methylene chloride as a disbursant) was injected into the room, the
concentration at that moment would have been 6,861 ppm.\563\ This
concentration was sufficient to induce dizziness and other anaesthetic
effects in humans.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\563\ 1,070 g MC/ 85 = 12.59 moles. 12.59 moles x 24.2 liters/mole =
304.63 liters of MC. There was 44,400 liters of volume in the bunker
(44.40 m\3\ x 1000 liters/m\3\ = 44,400). Thus 304.63/ 44,400 x 10\6\ =
6,861 ppm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As stated, however, the evidence is not determinative as to whether
one of the CEV's did, in fact, insert CS directly into the bunker.
Additionally, it is unknown if the bunker door was open or closed, a
factor that would have significantly affected the concentration levels
inside the room. Finally, the air circulation inside the building would
have affected the levels of methylene chloride present at any one time.
The subcommittees conclude, however, that it is possible that the levels
of methylene chloride in the bunker were such that the chemical impaired
the Davidians' ability to escape the room. Additionally, the possibility
cannot be dismissed that other Davidians, in other areas of the
residence, might have been similarly adversely affected if they were
directly exposed to an insertion of an entire cylinder of the CS agent/
methylene chloride mixture. Thus, the levels of methylene chloride that
were present in the Davidian residence as a result of the use of the CS
riot control agent might have impaired the ability of some of the
Davidians to be able to leave the residence had they otherwise wished to
do so.
g. analysis of the attorney general's decision to end the standoff on
april 19, 1993
1. The decision not to storm the residence
The subcommittees received testimony concerning the FBI's decision
not to storm the residence in order to end the standoff. Additionally,
the Justice Department Report on these events also discusses the factors
that went into this decision. According to that report, FBI tactical
experts believed that there was a substantial likelihood of significant
casualties to FBI agents if a frontal assault on the residence was
attempted. The FBI believed that the Davidians had fortified the
residence and were ready to offer resistance equal to or perhaps even
greater than that they had showed during the failed February 28 assault
on the residence by the ATF. The FBI was also concerned about the
possibility of suicide by the Davidians in the event of such an
assault.\564\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\564\ Justice Department Report at 259.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Experts on tactics testified before the subcommittees that a frontal
assault is one of the riskiest types of tactical operations.\565\ That
risk was even greater in this situation given the large size of the
structure and the wide-open areas around the structure with the
resulting lack of cover for any approach to the residence.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\565\ Hearings Part 2 at 315, 318 (statement of Donald A. Bassett).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The FBI's decision to pursue options other than a frontal assault in
order to end the standoff was a wise one. It seems clear that a raid,
even one better planned than that of the ATF of February 28, was of
unacceptably high risk. It is likely that FBI agents would have
sustained casualties in such an assault. Any assault on the Branch
Davidian residence also risked the lives of the Davidians. Additionally,
the FBI appropriately considered the possibility of suicide by the
Davidians in the event of an assault.
2. The reasons asserted for ending the standoff on day 51
a. The situation would not soon be resolved
One of the key factors influencing the FBI's decision to recommend
to the Attorney General that the standoff be ended on day 51 was the
belief by FBI officials that continuing to negotiate with the Davidians
would not lead to their peaceful surrender. At the hearings held by the
subcommittees, FBI chief negotiator Byron Sage testified that he
believed that further negotiations would not be fruitful.\566\ Tactical
commander Jeffrey Jamar testified that he was skeptical that
negotiations would end the stand-off, and that he became even more
skeptical after Koresh reneged on a promise to come out on March 2.\567\
Documentary evidence reviewed by the subcommittees indicated, however,
that some of the FBI's behavioral experts believed that there were
further steps that could be taken through negotiations. Additionally, at
the subcommittees' hearings, testimony was received from the attorneys
for the Davidians that they believed further negotiations could have led
to the Davidians' peaceful surrender.\568\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\566\ ``I never abandoned the concept or the hope that negotiations
could successfully and peacefully resolve this matter. My statement to
[Hubbell] at the time . . . was that I felt that negotiations were at an
impasse . . . .'' Hearings Part 2 at 345 (statement of Byron Sage).
\567\ Hearings Part 2 at 306-307.
\568\ See section VI E of this report.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sage's view was that Koresh had broken many of the promises he had
made throughout the standoff. After a experiencing a number of these
broken promises, Sage and the other FBI commanders believed that they
could not rely on Koresh's assurances.
Another factor that may have affected the FBI commanders' view of
the situation, but which was given little emphasis in the Justice
Department Report, is mental and emotional fatigue affecting the FBI
decisionmakers. Sage was one of the first FBI agents on the scene on
February 28. He worked every day, all day, of the 51 day standoff, and
only returned to his home in Austin for a short period of time on 1 day
to gather more clothes. Jamar and the other senior FBI commanders were
also on site for almost the entire time of the standoff. It seems only
natural then, that physical and mental fatigue would begin to set in and
that dealing with Koresh's rhetoric and disingenuousness would lead to
emotional fatigue as well. Indeed, the Justice Department Report
indicates that the law enforcement personnel present were tired and that
their ``tempers were fraying.'' \569\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\569\ Justice Department Report at 271.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nevertheless, FBI commanders to become firmly convinced that nothing
more would come from further negotiations with Koresh. That belief was
communicated by Sage to Associate Attorney General Webster Hubbell
during a 2-hour telephone conversation on April 15.\570\ This belief
played a crucial role in influencing Attorney General Reno's decision to
end the standoff on April 19.\571\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\570\ Id. at 270.
\571\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
During the hearings, however, the subcommittees received testimony
from the Davidians' attorneys that Koresh was hard at work writing his
interpretation of the Seven Seals discussed in the Book of Revelation in
the Bible. They believe that Koresh was willing to surrender when he
finished his writing.
The FBI's commanders knew of Koresh's desire to write this
manuscript but did not believe he was actually working on it. It appears
that fatigue and frustration at the lack of achieving success in
obtaining the release of additional Davidians may have led the
negotiators to be less than receptive to this information. That the
negotiators were not open to this new information, and did not pass it
on to their superiors, played a part in the Attorney General's decision
to end the standoff on April 19 and in the manner chosen to end it.
VII. The Attorney General's Decision to End the Stand-o
the children as shields
Another factor that went into the FBI's recommendation to the
Attorney General to end the standoff on day 51 was the fear that the
Davidians might attempt to breakout of the residence using the children
as human shields. According to the Justice Department Report, ``some
[unnamed] experts'' had suggested this possibility and that to combat
this possibility, the FBI had to be certain that its best trained troops
(the Hostage Rescue Team members) would be on the scene.\572\ There was
some doubt a
